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Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
the seminal school speech case interpreting the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
long before mobile devices and social media upended accepted
norms governing how students behave at school. The new reality
has brought with it new line-drawing challenges for public schools
faced with the warring requirements of school discipline on the
one hand, and the First Amendment on the other. The threshold
unanswered question this Article presents is whether Tinker should
give jurisdiction to public schools over student speech which
originates off campus. But the more difficult task is this: Assuming
Tinker does apply to off-campus speech, what legal test ought to
govern, in light of the patchwork of inconsistent rules the federal
courts employ. Building toward a novel theory to answer this
question, this Article first summarizes the precedents delineating
speech rights of students at public schools; then outlines the
federal circuit conflict arising out of the off-campus student speech
cases in the absence of Supreme Court guidance; and finally,
proposes a new rule for when and how Tinker should be extended
to off-campus speech, including cyberbullying.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court since October 2011 has at least four
times denied certiorari in cases implicating the question: Can
public primary and secondary schools1 exert disciplinary authority
1

This Article does not address the applicability of the student speech/First
Amendment Supreme Court cases discussed below to college students, a question the
Supreme Court expressly left unanswered in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.
484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988) (“We need not now decide whether the same degree of
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the
college and university level.”). Therefore, the student speech precedents this Article
discusses are presumed applicable only to primary and secondary schools. Note,
however, that great conflict exists among the federal circuit courts, as well as among state
courts, on whether Hazelwood is applicable in a college setting. See Keefe v. Adams, 840
F.3d 523, 531 (8th Cir. 2016) (denying First Amendment protection to a nursing student,
and upholding administrators’ decision to require that students comply with professional
fitness standards on or off campus); O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 932–33 (9th Cir.
2016) (finding a colorable First Amendment claim brought by a university studentplaintiff, while expressly noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
distinguished Hazelwood in Oyama v. University of Hawaii, 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir.
2015), and has declined to extend the pedagogical concerns analysis to university
setting); Oyama, 813 F.3d at 856, 862, 868–74 (involving hybrid student-employee,
wherein the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit focused on the Hazelwood
“imprimatur” of the school factor, discussed below, to find the student seeking
professional certification failed to qualify for First Amendment protection where
student’s stated views rendered him unfit to receive such certification on professional
grounds); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733–34 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Nothing in Hazelwood
suggests a stop-go distinction between student speech at the high school and university
levels, and we decline to create one.”); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875–76
(11th Cir. 2011) (applying Hazelwood in a university setting); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,
356 F.3d 1277, 1285, 1289–93 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a student’s First Amendment
claim based on compelled use of expletives in acting class and holding that such speech
“constitutes ‘school-sponsored speech’ and is thus governed by Hazelwood”); Student
Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Hazelwood . . . is not
applicable to college newspapers.”); see also Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289,
1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (analyzing the First Amendment claims of a public college student
who was also an employee of that college and noting: “The fact that the state could have
attempted to assert its authority over Watts as a student, subject to the Tinker restrictions,
does not prevent [the state] from asserting authority over him as an employee . . . .”);
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 943, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling that a graduate student who
included foul, offensive language aimed at faculty in his thesis paper was not protected
by the First Amendment); Yeasin v. Univ. of Kan., 360 P.3d 423, 424 (Kan. Ct. App.
2015) (ruling that the University of Kansas had no authority to expel a student who made
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consistent with the First Amendment over student cyberspeech2
that: (1) originated off-campus, (2) made its way onto campus, and
(3) at the time it was communicated, raised a reasonably
foreseeable risk of material school disruption or interference with
the learning of other students?3 This Article suggests an answer to
threatening remarks on Twitter); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 518 (Minn.
2012) (ruling that a mortuary science student who posted offensive material on Facebook
was protected by the First Amendment, because considering Facebook posts to be of
legitimate pedagogical concern would give Universities “wide-ranging authority to
constrain offensive or controversial Internet activity”). But see Frank D. LoMonte, “The
Key Word Is Student”: Hazelwood Censorship Crashes the Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 305, 341 (2013); Marcus Hauer, Note, The Constitutionality of Public
University Bans of Student-Athlete Speech Through Social Media, 37 VT. L. REV. 413,
423 (2012) (“[O]n a sliding scale, the speech restrictions allowed by universities fall
somewhere between the stricter restrictions allowed by high schools and the significantly
lighter restrictions allowed on the community at large.”).
2
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”). Cyberspeech for purposes of this Article is
speech emailed, texted, posted, tweeted, or otherwise communicated to a social media
website such as Facebook, to a hosted or unhosted “chat room,” to the comment section
of a news or information website, or directly to third parties via computer, cellular phone,
iPad, game console, or other electronic communication device. This Article has
constructed a composite definition of cyberspeech based on the many varying definitions
and related cyberbullying concepts reviewed. The definition adopted here relies, in part,
upon CORINNE DAVID-FERDON & MARCI FELDMAN HERTZ, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND YOUTH VIOLENCE: A CDC ISSUE BRIEF FOR
RESEARCHERS
3
(2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/electronic_
aggression_researcher_brief-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/GGX6-UMLM] (employing the term
“electronic aggression” rather than cyberbullying or cyberspeech); see also For Teens &
Tweens: Cyberbullying, MONT. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://dojmt.gov/safeinyourspace/forteens-tweens-cyberbullying/ [https://perma.cc/A8ZE-J3XV] (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).
3
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 1166
(2016) (No. 15-666), 2015 WL 7299351, at *i; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kowalski
v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 565 U.S. 1173 (2012) (No. 11-461), 2011 WL 4874091, at *i;
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Snyder, 565 U.S. 1156
(2012) (No. 11-502), 2011 WL 5014761, at *i; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Doninger
v. Niehoff, 565 U.S. 976 (2011) (No. 11-113), 2011 WL 3151990, at *i; see also Bell v.
Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1166 (2016); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
565 U.S. 1173 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d
Cir. 2011) (noting that the Supreme Court has not clearly opined on the authority of
schools to regulate student off-campus speech), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012)
(consolidating Snyder with Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 650
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), whereby the Snyder-Layshock single denial of certiorari might
technically be considered denial on two cases, bringing total certiorari denials on
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this pressing question, based on an analysis of the leading federal
cases involving off-campus speech impacting the school
environment, which increasingly involve cyberbullying. Scholars
and public policy experts have posited various definitions of
cyberbullying. Like traditional bullying, cyberbullying has been
described as “intentional aggressive behavior . . . repeatedly
[directed at] the same target.”4 The Center for Disease Control and
Prevention further characterized this form of “electronic
aggression” as an “emerging public health problem.”5 This Article
adopts the plain-language definition scholars Sameer Hinduja and
Justin W. Patchin use: cyberbullying is “willful and repeated harm
inflicted through the use of computers, cell phones, or other
electronic devices.”6
The issue was so new and unsettled that as of mid-July 2011,
the federal circuit level courts had decided only four cases on the
matter,7 followed quickly by another in late July8 and one on
August 1st9 of that year. Since then, just three additional federal
appeals court decisions have addressed this issue.10 The circuit
cyberbullying since October 2011 to five); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011); ARTHUR S. HAYES, MASS MEDIA LAW: THE
PRINTING PRESS TO THE INTERNET 49 (2013) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s repeated
declining of certiorari on this issue, “leaving school administrations to look to their state
or federal district or appeals courts for guidance”).
4
Raúl Navarro et al., The Impact of Cyberbullying and Social Bullying on Optimism,
Global and School-Related Happiness and Life Satisfaction Among [Ten to Twelve]Year-Old Schoolchildren, 10 APPLIED RES. QUALITY LIFE 15, 16 (2015).
5
DAVID-FERDON & HERTZ, supra note 2, at 4 (asserting that, in short, this is
“probably” an emerging problem, but that this question cannot be answered definitively
and warrants further research).
6
Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Social Influences on Cyberbullying Behaviors
Among Middle and High School Students, 42 J. YOUTH ADOLESCENCE 711, 711 (2013).
7
See Samuel Butler, IV, The Summer of Clarity: What the Summer of 2011 Says
About Student Speech Rights, 22 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 84 (2012); Emily Gold
Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials and the Limits
of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 592 n.3 (2011) (listing Snyder,
Layshock, Doninger, and Wisniewski v. Board of Education, 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007),
which are all discussed later in this Article). Waldman is cited in the leading off-campus
speech case, Snyder, 650 F.3d at 942, 947.
8
See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 565–67. This case is discussed further in Section IV.D.
9
See D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 754, 756–57
(8th Cir. 2011). This case is discussed further in Section IV.H.
10
See Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2013);
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 773–74 (8th Cir.
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courts are greatly conflicted in their treatment of student speakers,
and the federal courts’ application of the First Amendment to
legally indistinguishable fact patterns often seems arbitrary. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit protects an eighth
grader’s right to craft a fake MySpace page to tell dozens of her
classmates that her married principal is a bisexual sex addict with a
small penis, whose child looks like a gorilla, and whose wife looks
like a man.11 But in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the First Amendment provides no relief for a high school
senior class secretary candidate whose online blog refers to school
administrators as “douchebags” for cancelling a school concert she
helped plan.12 Both decisions, and others discussed below, purport
to apply Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District’s “material disruption” test13 to off-campus student speech,
but the approaches and results vary widely.14 Reconciling these,
and similar decisions, is impossible without a single, modern test
that the courts can easily understand and apply.
This Article’s purpose is to construct and apply such a test,
which would be applicable only to disruptive off-campus speech
targeting students.15 The Supreme Court has been willing to
restrict otherwise protected speech and expression to protect
minors where such restrictions would clearly violate the First
Amendment if those restrictions were aimed at the protection of
adults.16 The federal cases examining off-campus speech, while
inconsistent in their reasoning, generally evince a greater
willingness to relax First Amendment protections where the victim
2012). Both these cases are discussed later in the Article; see also Bell v. Itawamba Cty.
Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 391, 393 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
11
See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920–21.
12
See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 339–40, 350–51 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
565 U.S. 976 (2011).
13
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
14
See infra Part IV.
15
Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636–39 (1968) (upholding a law that
punishes adults for selling “girlie” magazines to minors, despite the challenge that such
non-obscene materials enjoy First Amendment protection if sold to adults); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 162–64, 170 (1944) (holding a child labor law banning
street sales of religious publications by minor children did not violate the
First Amendment).
16
See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636, 638; Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
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of the off-campus speech is a minor student.17 This legal issue is
particularly timely because of the explosion in the use of electronic
communication devices and social media networks—and the
attendant increase in cyberbullying—by students. These devices
and networks do not respect or even acknowledge traditional
physical schoolhouse boundaries, leaving government-run schools
to apply rules of campus speech which never contemplated the new
cyberspace reality.
The proposed new standard is a modern refinement of the
seminal Tinker test, but with greater clarity in the age of the
Internet. It should improve notice and predictability for students,
teachers, parents, principals, and administrators as to what kinds of
internet-based communications they can validly target and punish.
This Article is organized as follows: it first examines the
foundational framework of Supreme Court cases where the student
is speaking or expressing herself in school—the student speech
cases.18 Second, it reviews and summarizes each federal circuit’s
leading cases on off-campus speech,19 emphasizing the cyberbully
cases. Third, this Article introduces and makes the argument for a
uniform national standard, borrowing from the leading federal
circuit opinions that offer guidance toward an emerging bestpractice judicial trend. This trend is captured in the “TinkerCyberbully Test,” a proposed multi-part legal standard for courts to
apply when reviewing public school discipline decisions against
First Amendment scrutiny. Prior to this Article’s conclusion, the
17

Compare, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011)
(upholding the discipline of a high school senior who created a cruel website aimed at a
fellow student against a First Amendment challenge), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012),
with J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011)
(finding that the discipline of a middle schooler who created a cruel website aimed at the
school’s principal violated the First Amendment), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012).
18
This Article does not address speech by minors that lacks any arguable connection
to the school environment.
19
Several state courts have also wrestled with the problem of off-campus speech
and/or cyberbully speech. See, e.g., People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 485 (N.Y.
2014) (“Cyberbullying is not conceptually immune from government regulation, so we
may assume . . . that the First Amendment permits the prohibition of cyberbullying
directed at children, depending on how that activity is defined.”). Except where
specifically noted for a narrow purpose, state court cases are not included in
this discussion.
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six

actual,

I.
CONTEXT: CYBERSPEECH AND OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH
Without context, the potential regulation of off-campus speech
might be viewed as a legal issue separate and distinct from the
administrative regulation of cyberbullying. Indeed, there remain
fact patterns confronting the courts which involve off-campus
speech or expression which have nothing to do with the Internet or
cyberspeech.21 But based on the leading teen-behavior research22
and a review of the leading circuit cases,23 it appears that
increasingly, the regulation of cyberbullying and off-campus
speech are inextricably linked. To be sure, a disruptive print
newspaper or similar content can still be created off-campus then
20

This Article does not address constitutional limits on off-campus student speech
giving rise to criminal sanctions, including criminal cyberbullying, harassment, hate
crime, and similar prohibitions. This Article further does not address in detail the issue of
financial liability for public schools when a student takes his or her own life despite
notice to the school of cyberbullying, nor personal liability for teachers or school
administrators who allegedly violate the First Amendment rights of student speakers
under color of law or violations of Title IX for alleged failure of schools to protect
students from gender-based cyberbullying. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (providing that
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance”).
21
See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 2004)
(addressing a drawing made at home two years prior that inadvertently made its way to
school by its author’s younger brother); see also Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584,
585–86 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing a petition to remove a high school coach that was
“typed” by one player and eventually signed by eighteen players, although it is unclear
whether any of the players’ relevant acts took place off campus).
22
A seminal study on student use of teen social media released April 2015 found that
ninety-two percent of teens—defined as ages thirteen to seventeen—report going online
at least daily, more than half (fifty-six percent) go online several times a day, and about a
quarter (twenty-four percent) self-report that they are on the Internet “almost constantly.”
See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS, SOCIAL MEDIA &
TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 2015: SMARTPHONES FACILITATE SHIFTS IN COMMUNICATION
LANDSCAPE FOR TEENS 2 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-socialmedia-technology-2015/ [https://perma.cc/J72J-AUSM].
23
See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011)
(discussing a student who was suspended for creating a fake web page claiming
classmate had herpes and advanced a First Amendment defense to discipline), cert.
denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012).
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physically carried to campus,24 and bullies still shout insults as
they follow kids home from school.25 But in the age of the Internet,
it seems the law of off-campus speech regulation and the
administrative law regulating cyberbullying have merged. Thus,
this Article treats these two challenges as one—to the extent
practical—in search of a single solution.
II.
METHODOLOGY
The methodology applied in researching this Article is to locate
and review the leading federal circuit court off-campus student
speech cases involving a First Amendment challenge to school
administrative punishment; group those cases by precedential
value within their respective federal circuits;26 and glean from
those decisions (along with their concurring and dissenting
opinions) the most logical, broadly applicable, and sustainable
policy precepts guiding the courts in the absence of U.S. Supreme
Court precedent.
III.

MINORS & THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A. A Preface on Cyberbullying
Cyberbullying frequently occurs among minors, likely because
bullies can remain anonymous and more easily engage in
cyberbullying as compared to traditional “schoolyard” bullying.27
The Internet provides a “distancing effect” that often leads
cyberbullies to do and say crueler things than a schoolyard bully.28
A communication does not need to be made to a victim to
24

See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998).
See, e.g., C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2016).
26
Where no appellate court authority exits, special effort was made to locate and
review well-reasoned district court opinions. A few particularly well-reasoned state court
cases are discussed because they so closely framed the issue posed in this Article,
because of the quality of the particular court’s analysis, or both.
27
See, e.g., Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, State Legislation Mandating School
Cyberbullying Policies and the Potential Threat to Student’s Free Speech Rights, 33 VT.
L. REV. 283, 287–88 (2008).
28
Richard Donegan, Bullying and Cyberbullying: History, Statistics, Law, Prevention
and Analysis, 3 ELON J. UNDERGRADUATE RES. COMM. 33, 34 (2012).
25
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constitute cyberbullying.29 A communication need only be about
the victim.30
B. The First Amendment and Minors Generally
Speech in America is presumed protected by the First
Amendment, unless some far greater constitutional or policy
concern overrides this interest.31 This principle, so inviolate when
applied to adults, often yields to more paternalistic impulses when
applied to minors.32 The Supreme Court has noted: “The
schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to
experience the power of government.”33 However, minors are
accorded only a portion of the First Amendment protections and
liberties afforded to adults.34 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted the U.S. Constitution over a series of cases to construct
what is essentially a separate and distinct First Amendment for
minors and schoolchildren in America.35
29

See BARBARA GUZZETTI & MELLINEE LESLEY, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON THE
SOCIETAL IMPACT OF DIGITAL SCIENCE 536–37, 542 (2015).
30
See Raychelle Cassada Lohmann, Cyberbullying Versus Traditional Bullying,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (May 14, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/teenangst/201205/cyberbullying-versus-traditional-bullying [https://perma.cc/9XKT-XVLR].
31
See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) (“Where First
Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue
always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at
stake in the particular circumstances shown.”). Unprotected areas of speech are “of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)).
32
See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (“Because of the State’s
exigent interest in preventing distribution to children of objectionable material, it can
exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by
barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be suitable for adults.”
(quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. 1966))).
33
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
34
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (“The state’s authority over
children’s activities is broader than over like actions of adults.”).
35
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007) (holding materials such
as banners advocating illegal drug use can be banned and punished when displayed by
students at school-related events, even if off-campus); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263, 271, 273 (1988) (upholding censorship that prevented a
school newspaper bearing the imprimatur of school from including articles on pregnancy,
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There appear to be two distinct, though related, categories of
Supreme Court cases governing freedom of speech and expression
of Americans who have not yet reached adulthood. The first group
of cases involves the protection of minors, which might be called
the “child protection cases.”36 The second group arises where the
minor is the actual speaker and attends a public elementary or high
school, the so-called “student speech cases.”37 The child protection
cases include, without limitation, Prince v. Massachusetts,38
Ginsberg v. New York,39 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,40 and
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.41 The leading
student speech cases are West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette,42 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School

birth control, and divorce, so long as such censorship was based on some “legitimate
pedagogical concerns”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78, 686
(1986) (holding lewd and sexually suggestive speech by student at a school assembly
could be banned and punished with suspension despite a First Amendment challenge);
Prince, 321 U.S. at 160–64, 170 (holding a child labor law banning street sales of
religious publications by minor children did not violate the First Amendment).
36
See generally Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (concerning
state law restricting sale of violent video games to minors); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212–14 (1975) (considering appellee’s argument that, in
interest of protecting minors, city ordinance does not violate First Amendment);
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629 (concerning state law prohibiting sale of obscene material to
minors under seventeen years of age); Prince, 321 U.S. 158 (concerning state child labor
laws directed at minors selling religious material).
37
See generally Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (concerning high school student’s off-campus
speech online); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (concerning censorship of a high school
newspaper); Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (concerning sanctions against student for student’s
language during nominating speech at high school assembly); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (concerning school district’s ban on
wearing armbands to protest the “Vietnam hostilities” to school); W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (concerning board of education’s resolution that
state’s public schools obligate students to salute the flag or face action
for insubordination).
38
321 U.S. 158 (holding a child labor law banning street sales of religious publications
by minor children did not violate the First Amendment).
39
390 U.S. 629.
40
422 U.S. 205 (finding a Jacksonville ordinance criminalizing the showing of films
with nudity if visible from a public area invalid, and rejecting that the rationale for such
decision was protection of children).
41
131 S. Ct. at 2742 (holding a statute criminalizing the sale of violent video games to
children void).
42
319 U.S. 624.
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District,43 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,44 Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser,45 and Morse v. Frederick.46
For purposes of this analysis, the child protection cases are
largely distinguishable from the student speech cases for two
reasons. First, the student speech cases are adjudged to have taken
place within the context of the school’s broadly-defined
educational mission—generally on school property or at least at
school-sanctioned events.47 Second, in the student speech cases,
the speaker for First Amendment purposes is the student herself,
not a parent, guardian, or merchant who is being regulated or
banned from providing some speech or expression-related content
to a minor.48
C. The First Amendment and the Child Protection Cases
The U.S. Supreme Court found the protection of children is an
“exigent interest” of the government, worthy of material
adjustment of standard First Amendment protections American
adults take for granted.49 With mixed results, a number of cases
have tested the authority of government—consistent with the First
Amendment—to punish adults for: having children sell magazines
after a government-imposed restriction,50 exposing passerby
children to lewd scenes from a drive-in movie,51 selling lewd but

43

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
45
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
46
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
47
See, e.g., id. at 396.
48
See generally, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011)
(regarding sale of video games to a minor); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975) (regarding, inter alia, showing of films to minors); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (regarding sale of obscene material to minors); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (regarding use of children to sell religious material).
49
See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636, 638 (“[W]e have recognized that even where there is
an invasion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.’” (quoting Prince, 321
U.S. at 170)). The constitutional rights of adults are not automatically comparable to the
constitutional rights of children. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339–42 (1985).
50
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 170 (finding the statute valid).
51
See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 211–12 (finding the statute prohibited showing films
containing nudity where passersby may view them invalid).
44
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not obscene material to kids,52 or selling otherwise legal, but
violent video games to kids.53 The following subsections will
provide a more complete analysis of these cases.
1. Ginsberg v. New York
The Supreme Court has long held that special circumstances
and an exigent interest allow incursions into normal First
Amendment-protected activity that would be anathema to such
constitutional guarantees were the actor an adult.54 Thus, in
Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court found that criminal
penalties outlawing the sale of non-obscene “girlie” magazines to
minors did not violate the First Amendment.55
The Court, after reviewing a New York statute outlawing the
sale of sexually explicit material that could be legally sold to
adults, concluded that it could not “say that the statute invade[d]
the area of freedom of expression constitutionally secured to
minors.”56 The Ginsberg Court, in expressly rejecting an argument
based upon the First Amendment rights of minors,57 concluded that
section 484-h of the New York Penal Code58 did not violate the
52

See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642–43 (finding the statute prohibiting selling lewd but
not obscene materials to children valid and reasoning: “We therefore cannot say that §
484-h, in defining the obscenity of material on the basis of its appeal to minors under
[seventeen], has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors
from harm.”).
53
See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742 (finding the statute prohibiting otherwise legal, but
violent video games to kids invalid because “as a means of assisting concerned parents it
is seriously overinclusive because it abridges the First Amendment rights of young
people whose parents (and aunts and uncles) think violent video games are a
harmless pastime”).
54
See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (“The State also has an independent interest in the
well-being of its youth.”); Prince, 321 U.S. at 170 (holding that a state prohibition on
child sales of religious literature applied to boys under twelve and girls under eighteen
did not violate the First Amendment).
55
See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 643.
56
Id. at 637.
57
The court rejected First Amendment arguments advancing the speech or expression
rights of minors based on Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See id. at 637; see
also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 656 (1943) (citing Pierce v.
Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)); Pierce,
268 U.S. at 534–35.
58
Section 484-h of the New York Penal Code made it a crime “knowingly to sell . . .
to a minor” under seventeen years of age: “(a) any picture . . . which depicts nudity . . .
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First Amendment in that it “simply adjusts the definition of
obscenity ‘to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type
of material to be assessed in term[s] [sic] of the sexual
interests . . .’ of such minors.”59 In reasoning that the “State . . . has
an independent interest in the well-being of its youth,”60 the Court
noted that it is “altogether fitting and proper for a state to include
in a statute designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children
special standards, broader than those embodied in legislation
aimed at controlling dissemination of such material to adults.”61
2. Prince v. Massachusetts
The Ginsberg Court favorably cited Prince v. Massachusetts
multiple times,62 notably for the proposition that “the State has an
interest ‘to protect the welfare of children’ and to see that they are
‘safeguarded from abuses’ which might prevent their ‘growth into
free and independent well-developed men.’”63 While some
contrary authority exists in this area,64 the Court has also held that
a ban on otherwise protected First Amendment activity, such as
street newspaper sales by children, does not violate the
First Amendment.65
and which is harmful to minors,” and “(b) any . . . magazine . . . which contains . . . [such
pictures] . . . and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.” Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at
633 (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (1909) (current version at
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney 2017))).
59
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502,
509 (1966)).
60
Id. at 640.
61
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 312 (1965)
(Fuld, J., concurring).
62
Id. at 638–39 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).
63
Id. at 640 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 165).
64
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011) (holding the
California Act violated the First Amendment because it did “not adjust the boundaries of
an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition designed for adults
is not uncritically applied to children”). The California ban on the sales of violent video
games was struck down on the grounds that the law attempted to craft medium-specific
rules to govern video games, which offended traditional First Amendment principles. See
id. at 2742.
65
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 170 (“[T]he power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults, as is true in the case of
other freedoms, and the rightful boundary of its power has not been crossed in
this case.”).
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3. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the U.S. Supreme Court
employed content-discrimination analysis to invalidate a city
ordinance outlawing the display of nudity in movies if visible from
a public street, or “places where the offended viewer readily can
avert his eyes,” such as those displayed in drive-in theaters.66 The
rationale, ultimately rejected by the Court, was the protection of
children.67 The statute failed because it made arbitrary contentbased distinctions between non-obscene films with and
without nudity.68
4. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association
In Brown, the Electronic Merchants Association—a trade
group representing video game and software manufacturers—
preemptively sued the State of California to challenge a law
restricting the sale of violent video games to minors.69 The State of
California argued that Ginsberg should control its video game
child protection statute,70 and therefore, the court should uphold
the statute based on the same “adjust the boundaries” theory.71
However, the Court rejected this argument, distinguishing
Ginsberg on the theory that obscenity is a category of unprotected
speech with a long history of regulation,72 unlike exposure to
depictions of violence.73 The Court stated: “Because speech about
violence is not obscene, it is of no consequence that California’s
statute mimics the New York statute regulating obscenity-forminors that we upheld in Ginsberg . . . .”74 However, the Court left
room for analogous “adjust the boundaries” arguments to protect
66

422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975).
See id.
68
See id. at 213–14.
69
See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732–33.
70
See id. at 2735. California prohibited the sale or rental of “violent video games” to
minors, and required that their packaging and labeling be labeled “18.” CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1746.1–1746.2 (West 2017). The state statute, purporting to describe “violent video
games,” imposed a civil fine of up to one thousand dollars for their illegal sale to minors.
See id. § 1746.3.
71
See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735.
72
See id. at 2735–36.
73
See id. at 2735.
74
Id.
67
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children in areas where speech restrictions are based on tradition or
“historical warrant.”75
In analyzing the California video game statute, the Brown
Court relied upon its reasoning in United States v. Stevens, which it
distinguished from Ginsberg because “[t]here was no American
tradition of forbidding” depictions of animal cruelty, which the
statute in Stevens aimed to forbid.76 Instead, the Brown court
reasoned that only those categories of speech with a “tradition of
proscription” could be held to the more restrictive child-protection
First Amendment standards advanced by Ginsberg.77 The
“historical warrant” or “American tradition of forbidding”
obscenity justified the variable or “adjust[ed]” standard for
children without running afoul of the First Amendment.78 Hence,
the Brown court rejected this argument because depictions of
violence enjoy no such status as a historical exception to the
First Amendment.79
D. The First Amendment and the Student Speech Cases
Five U.S. Supreme Court cases define the First Amendment
rights and allowable governmental restrictions on public primary
and secondary school students who attend kindergarten through
twelfth grade. This Article refers to them as the student speech
cases,80 and discusses each below. Governments have long
attempted to restrict the speech of students, and in fact, have
frequently curtailed speech in schools that the First Amendment
would clearly protect if uttered by adults elsewhere. These five
cases, discussed in chronological order, with varying levels of
discussion based on their impact and ongoing legal
significance, are:

75

See id. at 2734–35.
Id. at 2734; see United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (finding that
a federal statute purporting to criminalize the creation, sale, or possession of certain
depictions of animal cruelty violates the First Amendment, because no historical warrant
or tradition exists for banning depiction of such acts).
77
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
78
Id. at 2734–35.
79
Id. at 2736–37.
80
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
76
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1. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette: No Forced
Political Student Speech
In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette—the first
major student speech case—members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses
religious faith brought suit for a declaratory judgment on behalf of
their children to invalidate a state law requiring that students recite
the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the American flag.81 The Court
ruled that the government, acting through school districts,
administrators, and teachers, cannot compel a student to make a
political pledge with which the student disagrees.82
2. Tinker’s ‘Disruption’ Standard Governs Student Speech ‘in
class or out of it’83
The second, and still most impactful, of the big five student
speech cases is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held: “First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students . . . .
This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost
[fifty] years.”84
Handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1969 during the
Vietnam War, Tinker stands for the proposition that passive, nondisruptive, symbolic, political speech—such as wearing black
armbands—is protected by the First Amendment, and cannot be
banned or punished by the student’s local public school or by the
government.85 In Tinker, three Des Moines public schoolchildren
81

See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 627–29 (1943).
See id. at 642.
83
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
84
Id. at 506 (“[T]his Court, in opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds, held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents States from forbidding the
teaching of a foreign language to young students. Statutes to this effect, the Court held,
unconstitutionally interfere with the liberty of teacher, student, and parent.” (first citing
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); then citing Bartels v. Iowa,
262 U.S. 404 (1923))).
85
See id. at 504–06. Because the Tinker facts and holding arose in the context of a
traditional local school district serving primary and secondary school students, the
applicability of Tinker’s holding to public colleges remains open. See supra note 1 and
accompanying text (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
273 n.7 (1988)).
82
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decided to fast for two days in December 1965 and wear black
armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War.86 School district
officials became aware of the plan, and passed an administrative
rule requiring schools to ask any student wearing such an armband
to remove it.87 The policy called for the suspension of any student
who refused until the student returned to school without the
armband.88 The Court repeated the oft-quoted proposition that “[i]t
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”89 In finding in favor of the students, the court
left unprotected only such student-based speech that “in class or
out of it . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”90 This Article accepts
the view of Judge (now Justice) Alito, who wrote that “[t]he
precise scope of Tinker’s ‘interference with the rights of others’
language is unclear.”91 Therefore, it is presumed that the
“interference” prong is incorporated into the “substantial
disturbance” concept for which Tinker is generally known. One
could argue that subsequent cases in this area have vigorously
enforced Tinker’s authority on behalf of student speakers who
communicate passively and non-disruptively.92 Federal courts
widely interpret Tinker to imply a “reasonable likelihood” of
disruption component, thus allowing schools to discipline students
prior to the occurrence of actual disruption.93
86

See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 506.
90
Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
91
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001).
92
See generally Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir.
2014) (upholding school district’s demand that students remove apparel displaying the
American flag because students doing so regularly sparked fights with other students);
Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2013) (upholding school
district’s demand that student remove apparel displaying the Confederate flag because of
the unique racial tensions between black and white students in that district); Jacobs v.
Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding a viewpoint neutral and
content neutral dress code).
93
See, e.g., J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981,
989 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding first, the First Amendment “does not require school officials
87
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3. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser: School “Within
Its Permissible Authority” When Sanctioning Lewd Speech
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,94 the third major
student speech case, was handed down in 1986—two years before
Hazelwood. In Bethel, a student speaker, while nominating another
student for elective office at the school, repeatedly used lewd and
sexually suggestive language, generally attached to some double
meaning.95 The court found that the language at issue was “an
elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”96
Chief Justice Warren Burger, who wrote the majority opinion,
stated the issue simply: “We granted certiorari to decide whether
the First Amendment prevents a school district from disciplining a
high school student for giving a lewd speech at a school
assembly.”97 The Court concluded that it does not.98 In reversing
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court
restated Tinker, and distinguished an expansive, erroneous reading
of that case from a more appropriate and accurate one: “[I]n
Tinker, this Court was careful to note that the case did ‘not concern
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the
rights of other students.’”99 The Fraser Court concluded that
exposure to lewd and indecent speech did indeed impinge on the
rights of other student listeners, holding “that [a school district]
acted entirely within its permissible authority in imposing

to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act. ‘In fact, they have a duty to
prevent the occurrence of disturbances,’” and that second, “Tinker does not require
certainty that disruption will occur, ‘but rather the existence of facts which might
reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption’” (internal citation
omitted) (quoting Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973))); see also Tinker,
393 U.S. at 514 (discussing school district’s burden to “demonstrate any facts which
might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption”
(emphasis added)).
94
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
95
See id. at 677–80.
96
Id. at 677–78.
97
Id. at 677.
98
See id. at 680.
99
Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
508 (1969)).
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sanctions upon [a student speaker] in response to his offensively
lewd and indecent speech.”100
But Fraser should be read narrowly for many reasons. First,
according to Justice Brennan’s concurrence, its holding is limited
to high school assemblies.101 Second, its holding technically only
applies to “disruptive language” at such assemblies.102 Third,
Fraser has been criticized for use of the term “captive audience” to
describe the student assembly, without providing clear definition
or guidance for lower courts.103
4. Hazelwood’s ‘Tolerate’ Versus ‘Promote’ Student
Speech Distinction
Tinker was substantially modified in 1988 by the fourth of the
five major student speech cases, Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.104 Hazelwood made the constitutionally significant
distinction between Tinker-governed student speech, which the
First Amendment requires government schools to “tolerate,” versus
speech that implies a government-school endorsement, such as the
content of a public school newspaper.105 The case centered on a
public school-sponsored student newspaper called “Spectrum.”106
Three former high school students who were staffers on
“Spectrum” sued the school district and school officials, alleging
that the principal’s decision to censor two pages based on content

100

Id. at 685.
See id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Thus, the Court’s holding concerns only
the authority that school officials have to restrict a high school student’s use of disruptive
language in a speech given to a high school assembly.”).
102
Id.
103
See, e.g., Erica Salkin, Are Public School Students “Captive Audiences?” How an
Unsupported Term in Fraser Created a “Mischievous Phrase” in Educational Speech
Law, 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 35, 35–37 (2015).
104
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
105
See id. at 270–71 (“[T]he question that we addressed in Tinker . . . is different from
the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote
particular student speech. The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a
student’s personal expression that happens to occur on school premises. The latter
question concerns educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”).
106
See id. at 262.
101
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violated their First Amendment rights.107 The principal cut an
article describing school students’ experiences with pregnancy, and
another article discussing the impact of divorce on students at the
school.108 The principal objected to the pregnancy story because
the pregnant students—although not named—“might be
identifi[ed] from the [con]text” and because he “believed that the
article’s references to sexual activity and birth control were
inappropriate for some of the younger students.”109 The U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the censorship decision because it was
based upon “legitimate pedagogical concerns” for the students at
Hazelwood East.110 The Hazelwood Court made no Tinker-style
inquiry into whether publication of the censored content would
have been disruptive or interfered with the rights of
other students.111
Hazelwood also stands for the proposition that the First
Amendment will not protect student speech that appears to carry
the school’s endorsement—that is, speech which “might
reasonably [be] perceive[d] to bear the imprimatur of the
school.”112 The specific examples the Court used in Hazelwood
justifying censorship were “school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities.”113 The
Third Circuit rejected a version of this theory in Layshock ex rel.
Layshock v. Hermitage School District.114 The school in Layshock
theorized that a student, by cut-and-paste copying his principal’s
photo from the district’s website, gave rise to a trespass as if he
had “broken into the principal’s office or a teacher’s desk.”115 A
strict reading of the Hazelwood “imprimatur” rationale gives the
school the discretion to regulate and ban “expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
107

See id; see also id. at 273 (articulating the “legitimate pedagogical concerns” test,
moving the boundary of limits on student speech rights).
108
See id. at 263.
109
See id.
110
Id. at 273.
111
See generally id. at 270–73.
112
Id. at 271.
113
Id.
114
650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
115
Id. at 215.
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perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”116 The
“imprimatur,” or brand of the school, would surely not be
associated with a fake web page or Facebook parody of another
student, unless the cyberbully both used the school computer or
network, and say, the school logo.
While Tinker and Hazelwood are widely accepted as the
“bookends” of student-speech law, the three other student speech
cases also merit consideration and discussion.
5. Morse v. Frederick: Opening the Door to Regulation of
Off-Campus Speech
Since 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court has only once tackled a
pure student speech case: Morse v. Frederick,117 the fifth and final
major case in this area. While the Morse case is generally known
for the proposition that public schools may constitutionally
regulate and ban on-campus speech advocating illegal drug use, it
also stretches the boundaries of the meaning of “on-campus.”118
Yet, that splintered and multi-voiced decision seems to have
provided more questions than answers.119 In Morse, the Court
found that the unfurling of a fourteen-foot banner, bearing the
words “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” by a student at a school-related
activity was unprotected speech.120 But the holding in Morse may
merely be the framing, rather than the resolution, of the real
question: In the wake of Morse and under the shadow of Tinker,
what are the practical rules governing school administrators’
116

See id. at 213 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271).
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
118
See id. at 400–01, 408–10.
119
See Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the First
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 380 n.152 (2007) (“However, the Court’s opinion also
noted that ‘[t]he five separate opinions in Morse illustrate the plethora of approaches that
may be taken in this murky area of law.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 604 (W.D. Pa. 2007))); see also Joyce Dindo,
Note, The Various Interpretations of Morse v. Frederick: Just a Drug Exception or a
Retraction of Student Free Speech Rights?, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 201, 237 (2008) (“As one
court described it, ‘[t]he five separate opinions in Morse illustrate the complexity and
diversity of approaches to this evolving area of law.’” (quoting Layshock, 496 F. Supp.
2d at 595)).
120
Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (“[W]e hold that schools may take steps to safeguard those
entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal
drug use.”).
117

256

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:233

ability to limit and punish student speech? What is the true
meaning of Morse? Is the holding’s literal language the limit of the
new constitutional ground the Court has plowed—that is, that
student speech can be regulated and punished if it can “reasonably
be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use”?121 The case includes
a jurisprudential history lesson on the law of students and minors
in Justice Clarence Thomas’ concurrence,122 as well as Justice
Alito’s broadside concurrence aimed directly at a theory advanced
by Morse’s counsel and the U.S. government: that the First
Amendment allows public school officials to censor any student
speech that “interferes with a school’s ‘educational mission.’”123
Note well that Justice Alito has long been troubled by the potential
overreach of the government’s interpretation of Tinker, particularly
the “interference” prong that has received far less attention than the
“disturbance” prong of Tinker’s holding.124
The full decision in Morse also contains a hair-splittingly
cautious opinion by Justice Breyer, who concurred in part and
dissented in part, because he believed that granting qualified
immunity to the principal, school, and district could resolve the
case without reaching the underlying First Amendment question.125
The bottom line is that six justices, based on their various Morse
opinions, support a reading of the First Amendment which allows
school districts to ban the advocacy of illegal drug use, so long as
this conclusion is not extended to mean schools can ban any

121

Id. See generally Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower
Courts: Stretching the High Court’s Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2008); Charles Chulack, The First Amendment Does Not Require
Schools to Tolerate Student Expression that Contributes to the Dangers of Illegal Drug
Use: Morse v. Frederick, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 521 (2008).
122
See Morse, 551 U.S. at 410–22 (Thomas, J., concurring).
123
Id. at 422–25 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting that case’s Brief for Petitioners).
124
See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.,
writing for the Majority) (“The precise scope of Tinker’s ‘interference with the rights of
others’ language is unclear . . . .”).
125
See Morse, 551 U.S. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(advocating a simple matter-of-law finding that the behavior of the school district in
Morse did not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known,” therefore giving rise to the winning defense of
qualified immunity, thus barring Frederick’s First Amendment lawsuit (quoting Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))).
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behavior which interferes with the school’s mission.126 This
limitation, which Justice Alito expressly demanded as a condition
for his concurring vote, in some ways recasts and restates the
“legitimate pedagogical concern” limitation of Hazelwood.127
E. Summary of Student Speech Cases
Nearly fifty years after it was handed down, Tinker is still the
primary controlling law in the area of government regulation of
student speech. The four other cases discussed above are best
understood as exceptions to Tinker. Hazelwood means a student’s
speech rights are limited if it appears he or she is speaking for the
school. Barnette held that students have the right not to avow
social/political beliefs with which they disagree. Fraser stands for
the proposition that students have no right to make lewd or
indecent comments at school gatherings of captive student
audiences. Finally, the rule of Morse may be merely that student
speech is unprotected if it advocates illegal drug use.
IV.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANALYSIS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ ABILITY TO REGULATE OFFCAMPUS CYBERSPEECH
Against this backdrop, a series of recent circuit court cases, and
a smattering of federal district and state appellate court opinions,
provide the most authoritative guidance for American jurists on the
off-campus speech question. Moreover, these cases provide a
blueprint of options available to the Supreme Court, should it
eventually decide the internet-era boundaries of school jurisdiction
over disruptive off-campus speech.128
A. First Circuit: No Controlling Appellate Authority
Research revealed no controlling internet era First Circuit
authority balancing the First Amendment against the disciplinary
126

See id. at 401, 410–22 (Thomas, J., concurring), 422–25 (Alito, J., concurring),
425–33 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127
See id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) (criticizing the “interfere[nce] with a school’s
‘educational mission’” standard and stating flatly that his concurring vote is premised
upon the assumption that the full court rejects this concept (citation omitted)).
128
See generally HAYES, supra note 3, at 49.
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jurisdiction of public schools for off-campus activity. A LEXIS
First-Circuit search of the words “Tinker v. Des Moines,” and a
separate search of the numeric citation of Tinker, each returned
sixteen cases since the year 2000.129 None of these cases were
related to off-campus cyberspeech.130 The single relevant decision
from within the First Circuit to off-campus speech involved an
internet-related dispute between a public high school and the
leader of a student group.131 In Bowler v. Hudson, a conservative
student leader at a so-called “First Amendment School[]” was
initially allowed to display a poster on school grounds listing an
internet address from an affiliated national student group that
featured links to savage beheadings as a means of opposing radical
Islamic terrorism.132 School officials ordered the student leader to
remove the internet address from the poster once the nature of the
content on the national group’s website came to their attention.133
Former and current students of the school sued, and the district
court found that the First Amendment protected the student’s right
to display the poster with the internet address.134 The court
analogized the removal of the internet address—which could only
be viewed off-campus because students’ ability to access the sites
129

The last search was conducted July 29, 2016.
See generally Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2002);
Pollack v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 75, No. 2:13-cv-109-NT, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64611 (D.
Me. Apr. 28, 2017); E.T. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals of the Div. of Admin. Law
Appeals, 169 F. Supp. 3d 221 (D. Mass. 2016); Berry v. RSU 13 Sch. Bd., 2:15-cv00146-JAW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23903 (D. Me. Feb. 24, 2016); Davidson v. City of
Cranston, 42 F. Supp. 3d 325 (D.R.I. 2014); Pollack v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 75, 12 F. Supp.
3d 173 (D. Me. 2014); Griswold v. Driscoll, 625 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Mass. 2009);
Campbell v. Hooksett Sch. Dist., No. 07-cv-275-JL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10917 (D.
N.H. Jan. 31, 2008); Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2007);
Garcia v. Sanchez, No. 02-1646 (ADC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102320 (D.P.R. Aug. 15,
2007); Governor Wentworth Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. Hendrickson, 421 F. Supp. 2d 410
(D.N.H. 2006); Cole v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1, 350 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Me. 2004);
S. Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. City of Boston, 297 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Mass.
2003); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2003); Comfort v.
Lynn Sch. Comm., 263 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Mass. 2003); Demers v. Leominster Sch.
Dep’t, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Mass. 2003); Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of
Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 2003).
131
See Bowler, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 172–75.
132
See id. at 172–73.
133
See id. at 174–75.
134
See id. at 171, 179–80.
130
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themselves were blocked by school computers—to removal of
books from a library, ultimately finding that the two cases were not
akin to one another.135
One other non-internet case bears mention. The First Circuit
upheld a suspension of a student who brought a First Amendment
challenge following off-campus creation and on-campus
distribution of a written “Shit List” of derogatory comments and
descriptions by students about students.136 The Donovan v. Ritchie
court, unlike the panel in the Fifth Circuit case of Porter v.
Ascension Parish School Board discussed below, did not take note
of the distinction between off-campus (potentially) inadvertent
transportation of offensive material versus intentional or
foreseeable transmission.137
B. Second Circuit: ‘Reasonably Foreseeable Risk’ Test for OffCampus Speech
The Second Circuit’s general rule is that public schools can
regulate off-campus cyberspeech under Tinker if there is “a
reasonably foreseeable risk that [it] would come to the attention of
school authorities and that it would ‘materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.’”138
In Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit rejected a studentplaintiffs’ argument “that off campus speech could not be the
subject of school discipline.”139 The court viewed the student’s
135

See id. at 180.
See Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 15–16 (1st Cir. 1995).
137
Compare id. at 18 (noting briefly students’ defense to their principal that the act
occurred off-campus, but analyzing that issue no further), with Porter v. Ascension Par.
Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 617–18 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting the fact that student’s drawing at
issue was introduced to the school accidentally). See generally infra Section IV.E for
further discussion of Porter.
138
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007)).
139
642 F.3d 334, 346 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043,
1045–46 (2d Cir. 1979)) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument, which relied on the proposition
that the Second Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court placed off-campus speech beyond the
jurisdiction of school officials), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011); see also Boucher v.
Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing a student-speaker who
unsuccessfully cited Thomas for the proposition that schools lack jurisdiction in all cases
over off-campus speech).
136
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argument as overstating the holding of Thomas v. Board of
Education, a seminal 1979 Second Circuit case standing for the
proposition that student speech explicitly created and kept off
campus should not be subject to school discipline.140 But
foreshadowing the Tinker-related problems the Internet would
bring, the Thomas court went on to say in dictum that it could
“envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial
disruption within the school from some remote locale.”141
The speculation of the Thomas court in the fast-evolving world
of online communications was validated in Wisniewski v. Board of
Education.142 In Wisniewski, a public-school student used an
instant messaging program to communicate with fellow students
from his home computer.143 For a three-week period, whenever he
sent an instant message, that message was accompanied by a
crudely drawn icon depicting one of his teachers being shot in the
head, with text below reading “Kill Mr. VanderMolen.”144
Eventually, the student’s instant messages and the icon came to the
attention of school officials, which led to a criminal investigation
and required “special attention” of school officials—among other
facets of “disruption” found by the court.145
The Wisniewski court cited Morse and Thomas, among others,
in determining that “[t]he fact that [the] creation and transmission
of the IM icon occurred away from school property does not
necessarily insulate [the student] from school discipline.”146 Where
the icon’s off-campus display “pose[d] a reasonably foreseeable
risk that [it] would come to the attention of school authorities
and . . . ‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and
discipline of the school,’” the student’s suspension for this display
did not run afoul of the First Amendment.147 The court applied the
Tinker standard because it was “reasonably foreseeable that the IM
140

See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 346–47.
Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052 n.17.
142
494 F.3d 34.
143
See id. at 35–36.
144
Id. at 36.
145
Id. at 36–37.
146
Id. at 39.
147
Id. at 38–39 (emphasis added) (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393, 403 (2007)).
141
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icon would come to the attention of school authorities” and that it
would “create a risk of substantial disruption.”148 The fact that the
student did not create the icon on school property did not “insulate
him from school discipline.”149
Under Tinker, schools must have “a specific and significant
fear of disruption, not just some remote apprehension of
disturbance.”150 School officials do not need to wait until a
disruption occurs.151 The majority in Wisniewski noted that one
judge on their panel would hold that courts should only uphold
school discipline of a student “for off-campus expression that is
likely to cause a disruption on campus only if it was foreseeable to
a reasonable adult.”152
The foreseeability “perspective” question is not the most
significant new issue highlighted by the Wisniewski opinion. The
court’s decision also noted its disagreement with other circuit
courts on the question of whether the criminal law “true threat”
due process standard should apply to school suspensions and
expulsions.153 The Wisniewski court decided that students did not
have the right to hold school administrators to the same proof
standard as law enforcement officials in Watts v. United States.154
Therefore, unlike in Watts, a principal may punish a student simply
by finding a reasonable likelihood of disruption under Tinker, as
contrasted with the requirement to prove the student subjectively
intended to threaten someone—or was at least reckless in
communicating a message that might have been interpreted as a
threat.155 This later approach, which again, conflicts sharply with
148

Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 39.
150
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001).
151
See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).
152
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 n.4 (emphasis added).
153
See id. at 38.
154
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (articulating true
threat standard allowing criminal punishment only where a reasonable recipient of the
speech would find that speech to be a serious expression of an intent to harm).
155
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (holding that threatening
statements are analyzed not from the perspective of the alleged victim, but by the intent
of the maker of the alleged threat, and that to support a criminal conviction, the mindset
of the speaker must be proven to evince a “true threat” which requires a certain level of
mens rea or intent greater than negligence).
149
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the Second Circuit’s Wisniewski analysis, holds schools to the true
threat standard of Watts, and has been adopted by both the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits.156
Thus arises the “Wisniewski” problem: If the student’s
ridiculous juvenile humor has elements of parody cloaked in
violence and there is no proof that he was not joking, can the
school nonetheless punish him consistent with the First
Amendment? Is the mere inclusion of the word “kill” enough
where no reasonable adult would find the threat of violence? What
if the police find that the student was joking and the threat was not
legitimate, as was the case in the actual Wisniewski case?157
The same court heard the case of Avery Doninger, a high
school student involved in the planning of a student concert called
“Jamfest,” which was postponed due to an adult’s scheduling
conflict that came up after the event date had been set.158 When the
school administrators suggested postponement, Ms. Doninger
objected and launched an internet-based campaign to rally students
to convince administrators to reverse the decision.159 When
administrators refused, she referred to them in her blog as
“douchebags,” and a campaign among fellow students continued to
protest the decision,160 for which she received a reprimand and
disqualification from running for student office.161 The Doninger
court interpreted the Thomas dicta as “suggesting that such
behavior, simply not present in the case before it, might
156

See Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621–32 (8th Cir. 2002) (en
banc); Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371–73
(9th Cir. 1996).
157
See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36 (“[A] police investigator who interviewed Aaron
concluded that the icon was meant as a joke, that Aaron fully understood the severity of
what he had done, and that Aaron posed no real threat to VanderMolen or to any other
school official. A pending criminal case was then closed. Aaron was also evaluated by a
psychologist, who also found that Aaron had no violent intent, posed no actual threat, and
made the icon as a joke.”).
158
See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 339 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S.
976 (2011).
159
See id. at 339–40.
160
See id. at 340–41.
161
See id. at 342. The student in the Doninger case also eventually led a student protest
that consisted of wearing shirts stating “Team Avery” or “RIP Democracy” to the
assembly for the election from which she was disqualified. See id. at 343.
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appropriately be disciplined.”162 As a result, the Doninger court
held that the student was not entitled to protection under the First
Amendment.163
C. Third Circuit: Tinker Reaches Off-Campus Speech
The Third Circuit analyzes school jurisdiction over off-campus
cyberbullying as a multi-part test, which sequentially applies the
precedents from the major student speech cases.164 If the student
speech is vulgar, lewd, and plainly offensive, it can be banned and
is controlled by the teaching of Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser.165 Second, if a reasonable person would believe the student
speech is made by or endorsed by the school, this “legitimate
pedagogical concern” allows the school to ban the speech under
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.166 Third, if the student
speech advocates illegal drug use, it can be banned under Morse v.
Frederick.167 If the fact pattern cannot extend to fit any of these
scenarios, Tinker controls and the student prevails, unless the
school can demonstrate that school administrators could
reasonably forecast either: (1) “that the students’ activities would
materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school”168 or (2) “material interference with school activities.”169
The court was disciplined in applying this approach, and was not
swayed by the outrageousness of the J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue
Mountain School District facts: To wit, an eighth grade school
child is protected by the First Amendment after building a faux
web-page ascribed to her principal, which insults him, his wife, his
son, and lampoons his sexuality.170 In finding for the student, the
Third Circuit noted that J.S. “took specific steps to make the
profile ‘private’” and that the principal’s investigation of the
162

Id. at 347.
See id. at 357.
164
See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925–27 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012).
165
See id. at 927.
166
Id.
167
See id.
168
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
169
Id. at 514; accord Snyder, 650 F.3d at 926.
170
See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920–21.
163

264

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:233

matter, not the web page itself, created any “disruption” related to
the incident.171
The Third Circuit was busy on July 13, 2011, handing down
not just Snyder, but also Layshock—employing similar reasoning
to the difficult questions surrounding the ability of school
administrators to punish cyberbullying.172 This Article treats
Layshock summarily and analyzes Snyder in detail, which has
richer facts, and appears to be the more nuanced and well-reasoned
of the two cyberbullying cases.173 In Snyder, middle school student
J.S. created a parody MySpace174 website which purported to be
the profile of her principal McGonigle, though it did not identify
him by name.175 J.S. used McGonigle’s official school website
photo, and created a mock announcement which satirically listed
“M-Hoe[‘s]” general interests as: “detention, being a tight ass,
riding the fraintrain, spending time with my child (who looks like a
gorilla), baseball, my golden pen, fucking in my office, [and]
hitting on students and their parents.”176 J.S. initially denied

171

Id. at 930–31.
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir.
2011) (en banc).
173
The same Third Circuit en banc panel that splintered in Snyder on June 13, 2011,
reached a unanimous fourteen-to-zero decision in Layshock, due apparently to the factual
differences in the cases. A concurrence in Layshock, written by Judge Jordan and joined
by Judge Vanaskie, reinforced the still-unresolved question of Tinker’s applicability to
off-campus speech: “Unlike the fractured decision in [Snyder], we have reached a united
resolution in this case, but there remains an issue of high importance on which we are
evidently not agreed and which I note now, lest there be any misperception that it has
been resolved by either [Snyder] or our decision here. The issue is whether the Supreme
Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, can be
applicable to off-campus speech. I believe it can, and no ruling coming out today is to the
contrary.” Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219–20 (Jordan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
174
MySpace is a “[s]ocial networking site that allows its users to create webpages to
interact with other users. Users of the service are able to create blogs, upload videos and
photos, and design profiles to showcase their interests. MySpace, BUSINESSDICTIONARY,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/Myspace.html
[https://perma.cc/N2B6XA35] (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
175
See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 929.
176
Id. at 920. The school principal’s wife, Debra Frain, worked at the school as a
guidance counselor and is the subject of several of the comedic insults posted on the
Internet by J.S. See id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
172
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involvement, but eventually admitted authorship of the online
parody, and the school suspended her for ten days.177
In its de novo review of the district court’s grant of the school’s
motion for summary judgment, the Third Circuit applied a
checklist from the student speech precedents, including substantial
school disruption, interference with the rights of others, and
lewd/vulgar speech.178 The Snyder majority opinion cited Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell,179 and earlier concluded that the profile
“though indisputably vulgar, was so juvenile and nonsensical that
no reasonable person could take its content seriously, and the
record clearly demonstrates that no one did.”180 The court also
found no substantial disruption.181 A few teachers fielded student
queries about the website, and one counselor lost twenty or thirty
minutes when forced to sit in on a parent meeting related to the
MySpace page.182 The court held that the speech was protected by
the First Amendment,183 though this conclusion does not settle the
matter of school jurisdiction over cyberbullies in the circuit.
Weighing the student’s First Amendment rights against the
alleged school disruption, the Third Circuit voted thirteen-to-six
for the conclusion that the school lacked the authority to punish
this particular student speech.184 It is noteworthy that five of the
circuit’s judges signed on to the majority’s conclusion, but not its
reasoning.185 The concurrence, written by Judge D. Brooks Smith
and signed by Chief Judge Theodore McKee and three others,
opined that Tinker does not reach off-campus speech at all.186 The
177

See id. at 922.
See id. at 926–27, 931 n.9.
179
See id. at 931 n.9 (citing and summarizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988), which “h[eld] that a libel claim
cannot survive where no reasonable observer can understand the statements to be
describing actual facts or events”).
180
Id. at 929.
181
See id. at 928.
182
See id. at 923.
183
See id. at 931.
184
See id. at 936.
185
See id. at 936–41.
186
See id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring) (“I write separately to address a question that
the majority opinion expressly leaves open: whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech
in the first place. I would hold that it does not, and that the First Amendment protects
178
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dissent, signed by six Third Circuit judges, would have upheld
J.S.’s suspension, granting her no First Amendment protection
under Tinker because, as a factual matter, J.S.’s behavior did in
fact disrupt her school with “vulgar, obscene, and personal
language” directed at school officials.187 But more to the point of
this Article and the overall cyberbullying debate, the dissent found
that jurisdiction over such student speech does rest with the school
under Tinker, just as the eight-judge majority opinion did.188 Judge
D. Michael Fisher, disagreeing pointedly with the Snyder
majority’s factual conclusion that J.S.’s words did not create a
substantial disruption, noted in the dissent that the “Supreme Court
has only briefly and ambiguously considered whether schools have
the authority to regulate student off-campus speech.”189 Thus the
six-vote dissent in Snyder, coupled with the eight votes for the
majority, likely form the most societally and judicially important
conclusion of Snyder. That conclusion is this: With the U.S.
Supreme Court silent on the matter, fourteen of the nineteen Third
Circuit judges—which this Article argues is the court with the
broadest, most in-depth and credible treatment of the problem—
hold that schools in the internet era do have the authority under
Tinker to regulate off-campus cyberbullying speech.190
A recent post-script to Snyder comes from the federal district
court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which found on
October 5, 2017, that a junior varsity cheerleader was protected by
the First Amendment against her high school’s attempts to
discipline her for a social media photo in which she “and a friend
h[eld] up their middle fingers with the [caption:] ‘fuck school fuck
softball fuck cheer fuck everything.’”191 It is noteworthy that the
Middle District Court of Pennsylvania read the Snyder Third
students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens
in the community at large.”).
187
See id. at 936–41.
188
See id. at 943 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“I believe that the rule adopted by the Supreme
Court in Tinker should determine the outcome of this case.”).
189
Id. at 942 (citing Waldman, supra note 7, at 617–18).
190
See generally Snyder, 650 F.3d 915 (noting agreement between the majority and
dissent as to applying Tinker); supra notes 178–89 and accompanying text
(noting same).
191
See B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-CV-1734, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 165177, at *1, *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2017).
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Circuit decision to mean public schools lack the authority to punish
off-campus speech if the punishment is based solely on the socalled Fraser exception, which allows schools to punish “lewd or
profane” speech.192
D. Fourth Circuit: The Kowalski Test: ‘Nexus’ to ‘School’s
Pedagogical Interests’
In the Fourth Circuit, the standard governing a public school’s
ability to regulate or punish off-campus cyberbullying is: The First
Amendment does not bar public school discipline or regulation
where the “nexus” between the student’s speech and the
“[s]chool’s pedagogical interests [is] sufficiently strong to justify
the action taken by school officials.”193
In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, Kara Kowalski, a high
school senior in Berkeley County, West Virginia, created a website
called “S.A.S.H.” from home that was dedicated to ridiculing a
fellow student, Shay N.194 Ms. Kowalski claimed the initials of the
site stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes,” although a
classmate who participated in the cyberbullying admitted that the
letters stood for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes.”195 Kowalski
invited one-hundred people to join the MySpace group, and two
dozen fellow students “joined” the electronic group, which allowed
large groups of users to post pictures and make comments.196 The
court found as a factual matter that Kara Kowalski’s principal
motive in creating the MySpace page was ridiculing the fellow
student.197 School administrators imposed a ten-day suspension
and a ninety-day “social suspension” on Kowalski, later reduced
after complaints from her parents, to a five-day suspension with a
192

See id. at *7; see also Snyder 650 F.3d at 932 (“The School District’s argument fails
at the outset because Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech.”). The Author notes
that the Snyder opinion allows for an alternate reading, given that Fraser distinguishes
punishable lewd student speech from speech outside of the school context. See id. at *6.
A fair reading of the term “school context” could include school-related social media
speech, in the Author’s opinion. See id. at *6–7.
193
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
565 U.S. 1173 (2012).
194
See id. at 567.
195
Id.
196
See id.
197
See id. at 576.
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ninety-day social suspension.198 The social suspension banned
Kowalski from “school events in which she was not a direct
participant.”199 Kowalski responded by suing the school and
various officials, claiming, among other things, that the First
Amendment and the student speech cases prohibit discipline of
students where that speech is not connected to “school-related
activity.”200 She argued that her speech was “private out-ofschool speech.”201
The Fourth Circuit rejected Kowalski’s arguments, framing the
issue as follows: “The question thus presented is whether
Kowalski’s activity fell within the outer boundaries of the high
school’s legitimate interest in maintaining order in the school and
protecting the well-being and educational rights of its students.”202
The court concluded that it did.203
E. Fifth Circuit: Tinker Reaches Off-Campus Speech
The Fifth Circuit has recently held that Tinker applies to offcampus speech, in the case of a foul-language rap song posted to
Facebook.204 The court in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board,
sitting en banc, reinforced the notion that it would impose an intent
standard on off-campus communications which school officials
believe may disrupt campus activities.205 The Fifth Circuit relied
heavily upon the reasoning of its 2004 opinion in the non-internet
case Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board.206 In Porter, a
student drew a crude sketch of his school under siege by a gasoline
truck tanker, replete with racial epithets, a missile launcher, and a
depiction of a brick being thrown at the school principal.207 The
student, Adam Porter, then fourteen years old, showed the “siege”
198

Id. at 569.
Id.
200
Id. at 567.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 571.
203
See id. at 574.
204
See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 391 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
205
See id. at 391, 396.
206
See id. at 394–96 (discussing Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th
Cir. 2004)).
207
See 393 F.3d at 611.
199
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drawing to his mother, younger brother, and one other person in
his home, and the drawing was then placed in a closet.208 The pad
apparently remained there for two years until Adam’s younger
brother, rummaging through the closet to find something to draw
on, found the pad and used one of its other pages to draw a sketch
of a llama.209 While riding a school bus, the brother showed the
sketchpad with the llama to a fellow student who flipped through
the pad and spotted Adam’s “siege” drawing, gave the pad to the
bus driver, and said “Miss Diane, look, they’re going to blow up
[our school].”210
Adam was subsequently threatened with expulsion and sent to
alternative school.211 He eventually returned to his former high
school, but dropped out.212 On his behalf, his mother sued the
school and the local school district, alleging, among other claims,
violation of Adam’s First Amendment rights under the U.S.
Constitution.213 The trial court granted summary judgment for the
district and other defendants.214 Porter appealed, and the Fifth
Circuit found in his favor on the First Amendment claim.215 The
court’s reasoning was simple, elegant, and instructive for courts
now deciding cases in the social media era.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that Adam did not intentionally or
knowingly communicate his drawing in a way sufficient to remove
it from the protection of the First Amendment: “Because Adam’s
drawing cannot be considered a true threat as it was not
intentionally communicated, the state was without authority to
sanction him for the message it contained.”216 The court noted that
208

See id.
See id.
210
Id.
211
See id. at 612.
212
See id.
213
See id.
214
See id. at 613.
215
See id. at 625 (disagreeing with district court’s finding concerning the First
Amendment, but affirming on the alternate ground that only the challenge to summary
judgment as it pertained to the principal was maintained, and the principal was entitled to
qualified immunity).
216
Id. at 618. Scholars have roundly criticized the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in the
true-threat context for its lack of guidance to lower courts. See, e.g., W. Wat Hopkins,
Cross Burning Revisited: What the Supreme Court Should Have Done in Virginia v.
209
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the fact that “the introduction of the drawing to [the high school]
was wholly accidental and unconnected with Adam’s earlier
display of the drawing to members of his household is
undisputed.”217 The court concluded that private writings enjoy the
protection of the First Amendment, and losing such protection
requires “something more than their accidental and unintentional
exposure to public scrutiny.”218 The language of the Fifth Circuit
on its face, then leaves open the possibility—indeed the
likelihood—that private writings intentionally exposed to public
scrutiny would lose their private character, and thus their presumed
First Amendment protection.219 But the rule from the case, which
might be called the Porter Rule, is that offensive speech
inadvertently transmitted to the school environment is beyond the
reach of school administrative discipline.
The Bell court adopted the same “intent” reasoning: “Porter
instructs that a speaker’s intent matters when determining whether
the off-campus speech being addressed is subject to Tinker. A
speaker’s intention that his speech reach the school community,
buttressed by his actions in bringing about that consequence,
supports applying Tinker’s school-speech standard to
that speech.”220
F. Sixth Circuit: Lowery Rule Leaves Anti-Coach Petitions
Unprotected
In the Sixth Circuit, the law of school jurisdiction over offcampus speech is unsettled. Shortly before the Second Circuit’s
decision in Doninger, the Sixth Circuit handed down Lowery v.
Euverard, a non-internet case of off-campus student speech
transmitted into the school environment.221 In Lowery, a group of
football players signed a petition calling for the firing of their
Black and Why It Didn’t, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 269, 314 (2004); John
Rothchild, Menacing Speech and the First Amendment: A Functional Approach to
Incitement that Threatens, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 207, 212–13 (1999).
217
Porter, 393 F.3d at 617.
218
Id. at 617–18.
219
See id.
220
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 395 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
221
See 497 F.3d 584, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2007).
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football coach.222 The players intended to hold the petition until
after the season, when Lowery, and perhaps others, would give it
to the school principal in an attempt to get the coach replaced as
head coach of the football team.223 The Lowery Court notes that a
player “typed” the petition and that eighteen players “eventually
signed” it, although the court is silent on whether these acts took
place on campus or off.224 When the coach discovered the petition,
he called the players in one by one and asked whether they were
aware of the petition, whether they’d signed it, and whether they
wanted to play football under the current coach.225 Those who
answered “no” to the third question, and refused to apologize if
they signed, were dismissed from the team.226 The Sixth Circuit
concluded that the school did not violate the players’ First
Amendment rights.227 In rejecting the students’ First Amendment
claim, the court noted that the players were free to continue trying
to have the coach fired, but not as team members “actively
working to undermine his authority.”228
G. Seventh Circuit: District Court Presumes Tinker’s Reach in
Teen Sexual Photos Posting Case
In the Seventh Circuit, the law of school jurisdiction over offcampus speech, including cyberbullying speech, is unclear.229 The
222

Id. at 585–86. The opinion is silent on where the petition was drafted. See generally
id. What is clear is that the Tinker analysis employed by the Lowery court did not rely on
any presumption that the petition and player signings were done on campus. See
generally id. (failing to examine whether the speech occurred on or off campus at all).
Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis turns solely on the presumption of potential substantial
disruption, and does not require as a condition precedent for discipline that the student
speech have been uttered on-campus or at a school event. See generally id. (speaking
neither of location on or off campus).
223
See id.
224
See generally id.
225
Id. at 586.
226
See id.
227
See id. at 600–01.
228
Id. at 600 (employing a Tinker-style disruption analysis).
229
While research revealed no Seventh Circuit cases opining specifically on the postTinker standard to be applied to off-campus speech transported to campus, the plaintiff in
Boucher v. School Board tried unsuccessfully to make the argument for an off-campus
analysis. See 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998). The Boucher court, however, found that
because the underground newspaper at issue in the case was in fact distributed on campus
and advocated behavior on campus, the off-campus analysis was unnecessary. Id.
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circuit—employing somewhat circular reasoning—found that offcampus speech deemed to be within the jurisdiction of school
officials is de facto on-campus speech.230 This approach avoids any
need to construct an analytical framework to determine when and
under what circumstance, absent intentional physical transport onto
the campus, such speech which originates off campus is subject to
school jurisdiction. Research revealed no Seventh Circuit appellate
cases adjudicating a public school district’s reach to
off-campus speech.
Still, one case from within the district provides some insight
into what the Seventh Circuit might do with a cyberbullying matter
of first impression.231 In T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green
Community School Corp., an Indiana district court found that a
school district violated the First Amendment rights of two students
who “posed for some raunchy photos which they later posted
online.”232 The photos, taken in a private home at a teen slumber
party, were posted on social media websites Facebook, MySpace,
and Photo Bucket, and eventually came to the attention of the
school officials, who suspended the two students from
participating in certain school activities.233 The teenage girls in the
photos used a lollipop to mimic sex organs, simulated sex between
the pajama-clad participants, and posted a photo with the
accompanying words: “Wanna suck on my cock.”234
After laying out the facts, Judge Philip P. Simon, Chief District
Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, reasoned through an
230

See id. In looking to the Seventh Circuit for direction in the absence of its own
Eleventh Circuit’s guidance, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
reasoned that Boucher is part of a “line of early cases that have determined that student
speech concerns are implicated when speech published off-campus is brought oncampus.” Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2010). The case does
not inquire into the method of transportation or the intent of the author of the speech.
See generally id.
231
See generally T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d
767, 774–85 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (discussing First Amendment concerns and applying
Tinker’s “substantial disruption” analysis, while resorting to Third Circuit precedent J.S.
Snyder, which the B.V. court determined to “assume[] without deciding that Tinker
applied to the student’s off-campus” speech).
232
Id. at 771, 790.
233
See id. at 771–74.
234
Id. at 772.
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extensive First Amendment analysis, noting: “The Supreme Court
has not considered whether Tinker applies to expressive conduct
taking place off school grounds and not during a school activity
and has in fact noted that ‘[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer
boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech
precedents.’”235 The B.V. court, following what it took to be the
national trend, assumed that Tinker applies to off-campus speech,
making it theoretically possible for the school to punish or ban the
lewd behavior.236 In fact, however, the court found the girls’ silly
faux-sex slumber party photos and posts were non-profane
expressions of “crude humor,” and were thus protectable
expression “within the ambit of the First Amendment.”237 Judge
Simon wrote: “Ridiculousness and inappropriateness are often the
very foundation of humor. The provocative context of these young
girls horsing around with objects representing sex organs was
intended to contribute to the humorous effect in the minds of the
intended teenage audience.”238 Analysts reviewing B.V. should
take care to note that the student in the case may have won the
battle but lost the war. The court clearly found that the school had
jurisdiction over the off-campus speech,239 and such a presumption
is now a given among most federal courts.240 The B.V. court left
little doubt that, on the appropriate facts, it could uphold a school
suspension based on off-campus cyberspeech.241
H. Eighth Circuit: Clear Support for School Discipline of OffCampus Speech
In the Eighth Circuit, public primary and secondary schools
clearly have administrative jurisdiction over off-campus
235

Id. at 781 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007)
(alteration in original)).
236
See id. at 781 (“In the present context, I will also assume without deciding that
Tinker applies, because even under its contextual narrowing of the right of free speech, I
conclude that the school officials violated the First Amendment rights of plaintiffs T.V.
and M.K.”).
237
Id. at 776.
238
Id.
239
See id. at 781 (applying the Tinker standard).
240
See generally infra Part V and accompanying text (discussing the application of
Tinker among the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal).
241
See B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 771–81.
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cyberbullying. Two very different cases illustrate the views of the
circuit. In D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School District #
60, a minor sent instant messages to a fellow student about
bringing a gun to school, and about specific students and the types
of students he would like to shoot.242 Reviewing only
administrative action by the school, the Eighth Circuit discussed
Tinker and its progeny, and noted:
In none of these cases was the [Supreme] Court
faced with a situation where the First Amendment
question arose from school discipline exercised in
response to student threats of violence or for
conduct outside of school or a school sanctioned
event. Such cases have been brought in the lower
courts, however, and the courts of appeal have taken
differing approaches in resolving them.243
D.J.M. argued to the court that his speech was not “student speech”
because it was made online and outside the school environment.244
The court rejected this argument and upheld the suspension.245
A year later, the Eighth Circuit heard S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v.
Lee’s Summit R-7 School District,246 a more traditional
cyberbullying case. In Wilson, twin brothers set up a sexually
explicit and racist blog which, according to the court, was
“targeted at” the district’s high school.247 In rejecting the First
Amendment challenge to the 180-day suspension brought by
S.J.W.’s parents on behalf of their minor children, the Eighth
Circuit considered and rejected the students’ argument that “all
off-campus speech is protected and cannot be the subject of school
discipline, even if the speech is directed at the school or
specified students.”248

242

See 647 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 761.
244
Id. at 760 (“He also argues that his speech was not student speech because it was
online outside of school.”).
245
Id. at 765.
246
696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012).
247
Id. at 775.
248
Id. at 776.
243
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I. Ninth Circuit: The Wynar Rule: Off-Campus Speech
Punishable
In the Ninth Circuit, off-campus messages are subject to public
school administrative jurisdiction and punishment. In Wynar v.
Douglas County School District,249 the Ninth Circuit found no First
Amendment violation in the school’s discipline of a student
following “increasingly violent and threatening” internettransmitted MySpace chat messages.250 These messages, for
example, discussed raping girls’ dead bodies, hero worship of
Adolph Hitler, and details of who to shoot and kill first on a “hit
list” of students.251 The student, Landon Wynar, complained online
that the Virginia Tech mass killer got too much notoriety for his
killing spree:252 “[T]hat stupid kid from vtech. he didnt do shit and
got a record. i bet i could get 50+ people / and not one bullet would
be wasted.”253 The Wynar court, noting the lack of Supreme Court
guidance, directly addressed the question of whether the First
Amendment protects students from school discipline for offcampus speech.254 To answer this question, the court said it would
“look to our circuit precedent and to our sister circuits for
guidance.”255 The court then engaged in a detailed analysis which
expressly adopted Tinker’s “disruption or interference” standard,
before concluding that the First Amendment does not insulate
students from discipline for disruptive off-campus speech, or
speech which interferes with the rights of other students.256
In a 2016 case, the Ninth Circuit clarified that off-campus
speech jurisdiction is not premised upon the risk of violence. In a
well-reasoned decision based on facts not involving cyberspeech,
the Ninth Circuit in C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene School District
4J, analyzed the leading off-campus speech cases from the Fourth,
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits to hold that student-to-student verbal
sexual harassment which occurred “several hundred feet” from
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256

728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).
See id. at 1064–65, 1067–72.
See id. at 1065–66.
See id. at 1066.
Id.
See id. at 1067.
Id.
See id. at 1067–72.
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campus is indeed subject to school regulation under Tinker.257 The
court employed a nexus-to-school/foreseeability analysis
developed by the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski.258 Thus, although this
Article relies heavily upon the premise that in the internet era,
much of the off-campus Tinker analysis becomes conflated with a
discussion of cyberbullying, the facts and reality of traditional
bullying remain a concern for schools and the courts.
J. Tenth Circuit: No Controlling Case Authority
There is no controlling Tenth Circuit authority on the ability of
schools to administratively punish off-campus speech. However,
one unpublished decision from a district court within the Tenth
Circuit is noteworthy because it reinforces the Fifth Circuit holding
in Porter. In D. G. v. Independent School District No. 11, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, in an
unpublished case, overturned the suspension of a student who
wrote a poem containing such words as “Killing Mrs. [Teacher]”
and “I hate this class it is hell.”259 The poem was never
communicated to the teacher and, based on the factual record, it
appears the discovery of the poem was completely inadvertent.260
The court’s approach was to first analyze the facts under a
modified version of Watts—would a reasonable person believe the
message would communicate a serious intent to harm?261 Then, the
court applied a standard Tinker analysis: was the speech materially
disruptive?262 The court answered both questions in the negative
and ordered the student reinstated in school.263

257

See C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1147, 1152–55 (9th Cir. 2016).
See id. at 1149–52 (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573
(4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012)).
259
See No. 00-C-0614-E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at *3, *19 (N.D. Okla.
Aug. 21, 2000).
260
See id. at *3–7.
261
See id. at *11–13.
262
See id. at *14–15.
263
See id. at *18–19.
258
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K. Eleventh Circuit: District Court Protects Student-Critic
of Teacher
There is no controlling Eleventh Circuit authority on the issue
of school jurisdiction over off-campus speech. The federal district
court in the Southern District of Florida, however, wrestled
comprehensively with the special issues raised in the modern
internet era in Evans v. Bayer.264 In Evans, a student created a
group on Facebook, a social networking website, entitled, “Ms.
Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met” and was
disciplined.265 The Evans court discussed the Seventh Circuit’s
approach in Boucher, which construed off-campus speech as
automatically converted to on-campus speech when it reaches
campus and disrupts the campus environment.266 Despite noting
that this approach “is not as easily suited to intangible situations
like the [I]nternet,” the Evans court nonetheless predicted that
“ultimately some guise of it will control.”267
The Evans court found the speech was off-campus speech, but
that “schools can discipline off-campus speech if it is unprotected
speech.”268 The student’s creation of the website was a nondisruptive, non-threatening opinion, and was not prohibited by any
other free-speech exception—such as lewdness or advocacy of
illegal action—and thus protectable under the First Amendment.269
L. D.C. Circuit: No Controlling Appellate Authority
There is no controlling D.C. Circuit authority on the ability of
schools to administratively punish off-campus speech.

264

684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
Id. at 1367.
266
See id. at 1371 (citing Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998)).
267
Id.
268
Id. at 1372.
269
See id. at 1374 (“Evans’s speech falls under the wide umbrella of protected speech.
It was an opinion of a student about a teacher, that was published off-campus, did not
cause any disruption on-campus, and was not lewd, vulgar, threatening, or advocating
illegal or dangerous behavior. Therefore, the Court finds that Evans had a
constitutional right.”)
265
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M. Summary of Federal Off-Campus Speech Cases
In summary, there appears to be no controlling federal circuit
court authority balancing the First Amendment against public
school administrative discipline of off-campus cyberspeech in six
of the twelve regional circuits: the First,270 Sixth, Seventh,
Tenth,271 Eleventh, and the District of Columbia.272 Lower courts
in at least three of these six “silent” circuits—the Seventh, Tenth,
and Eleventh—have heard cyberspeech cases in the absence of
circuit guidance, and each of these district courts’ analyses appears
to presume Tinker’s applicability to off-campus cyberspeech.273
The other six regional circuits—the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth, and Ninth—have rendered detailed First Amendmentbased appellate decisions on the question of public school
jurisdiction over cyberbullies. Collectively, these circuits have
produced at least ten opinions274 which pit regulation of off270

The First Circuit has authority for the proposition that public schools are limited in
their ability to restrict information leading to potentially offensive cyberspeech, such as
censoring a URL on an in-school club poster. See Bowler v. Town of Hudson,
514 F. Supp. 2d 168, 178 (D. Mass. 2007).
271
Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide an off-campus
cyberbully case on point, it heard and decided Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist.,
713 F.3d 25, 36–39 (10th Cir. 2013), in which a student’s First Amendment challenge to
a licensing scheme was turned away with language that implied strong deference to
school district administrators. See id. at 36–39. The court ruled:
[T]he [school’s] policy imposes substantive constraints on official
discretion that are constitutionally sufficient in the special context of
a public school, where students enjoy free speech rights but not to the
same extent as they would in the public square. Additionally, we note
that our conclusion is consistent with the trend of decisions of our
sibling circuits on this issue.
Id. at 43.
272
See circuit-by-circuit analysis from en banc opinion in Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch.
Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“The remainder of the circuits ([F]irst,
[S]ixth, [S]eventh, [T]enth, [E]leventh, D.C.) do not appear to have addressed this
issue.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
273
See generally T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d
767 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (exampling such a district court decision within the Seventh
Circuit); Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (exampling such a district court decision within the
Eleventh Circuit); D. G. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. 00-C-0614-E, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12197 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (exampling such a district court decision from the
Tenth Circuit).
274
See generally Bell, 799 F.3d 379; Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062
(9th Cir. 2013); S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th
Cir. 2012); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756 (8th
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campus cyberspeech against the First Amendment. This Article
now distills from these cases, together with particularly compelling
federal district court opinions, the most fair, durable, and broadly
applicable policy guidance in an attempt to formulate a
national rule.
V.

BEST-PRACTICE LEGAL CONCEPTS EMERGING FROM THE
FEDERAL CASES
A half-dozen principles emerge as best-practice judicial
concepts from the federal off-campus student speech cases.275
Below, these factors are listed and discussed. Later, they are
incorporated into the Tinker-Cyberbully Test.
COMEDY. First, parody, lampooning authority, and hyperbole
will be protected if directed toward school administrators. Snyder
and Layshock are the leading examples.276 The rationale seems to
be that adults are more mature and have more capacity to
withstand caustic, comedic speech. Also, adult employees are
present at school by choice, unlike students, whose attendance is
compulsory. If the speech is merely narcissistic, harmless sexual
exhibitionism, the student wins, not because the speech is
approved by the school, but because such regulation is beyond the
school’s jurisdictional reach.277

Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Snyder v.
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156
(2012); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011);
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d
34 (2d Cir. 2007).
275
As noted earlier, this Article attempts to rely upon federal circuit authority.
Deviation from this methodology is justified and noted where a circuit lacks off-campus
speech cases, or where a district court has released an opinion with particularly
compelling reasoning in a case with a relevant fact pattern.
276
See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 929, 933 (upholding First Amendment rights for MySpace
page parodying a teacher); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207–08 (upholding First Amendment
rights for MySpace page parodying a principal). But see Doninger, 642 F.3d at 340, 351
(upholding ban on a would-be student office candidate from running because she called
school administrators “douchebags” in a blog after they delayed a concert she helped
plan), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011).
277
See, e.g., B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (“I can conclude as a matter of law that the
substantial disruption required by the Tinker test was not reasonably forecast.”).
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DIRECT STUDENT BULLYING. Second, cruelty or vicious
meanness aimed directly at a fellow student, or racist/sexist
comments aimed at a target group, combined with affirmative
transmission and disruption is typically unprotected speech. This is
so even if the speech was transmitted from off-campus, and was
only brought to the attention of students and campus officials via
the Internet. Wilson and Kowalski are good examples.278 If the
speech is both comedic cruelty and directed at another student—
i.e., Student’s Against Shay’s Herpes—the speech is more likely to
be unprotected, particularly where other students are invited to join
in on the cruelty.279
OPINION. Third, there appears to be a developing “opinion”
privilege under the First Amendment allowing students to critique
their administrators and teachers, so long as the student speech
does not run afoul of some other prohibition.280 If “Ms. Sarah
Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met”281 is protected—and it
should be—then it seems any legitimate critique of the
performance of a teacher, administrator, school employee, school
board member, or superintendent by a student also should be
protected.282 This analysis, however, puts Doninger outside what
appears to be the majority trend in these cases.283
VIOLENT SPEECH/TRUE THREATS. Fourth, violent speech
drafted off-campus but communicated to campus via the Internet,
without more facts, will be de facto unprotected.284 There are many
examples, but representative among them are D.J.M. and Wynar.285
278

See generally Wilson, 696 F.3d 771 (analyzing suspension of students for creation of
a blog containing racist and sexist comments about other students); Kowalski, 652 F.3d
565 (analyzing suspension of student for creating a webpage ridiculing another student),
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012).
279
See, e.g., Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567–74.
280
See, e.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
281
Id. at 1367.
282
See id. at 1376–77.
283
In Doninger, the court upheld a student’s ban from running for student office after
she criticized the school administration on her blog. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d
334, 351 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting, however, that her criticism instigated on-campus
disruptive activities, such as protests).
284
See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38–40 (2d Cir. 2007).
285
See generally Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding no protection of speech regarding plans for a school shooting); D.J.M. ex rel.
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These two cases
administrative/school
juvenile detention.286

include facts supporting not
suspension, but also arrest

281

just
and

The tougher student speech cases in the violent/threatening
speech sub-arena are those with a mix of comedy and violence—
sometimes complicated by a student’s legitimate First
Amendment-protected opinion about the competence, skill, or
allegedly improper behavior of a school employee.287 The
representative federal appellate case from this category is
Wisniewski.288 The U.S. Supreme Court has recently determined
unequivocally that for a defendant to be convicted of the crime of
communicating a true threat, the government must prove that the
criminal defendant had some mens rea, or state of mind, bordering
on or equal to intent to communicate the threat.289 In Elonis v.
United States, the Court found that allegedly threatening
statements should be reviewed by courts, not from the perspective
of the alleged victim, but by the intent of the defendant who
communicated the alleged threat.290 The Court stated that for a
defendant who makes an alleged threat, “wrongdoing must be
conscious to be criminal.”291 The Court left open the question
whether recklessness (as opposed to affirmatively intentional
conduct) was a sufficient state of culpability to support a criminal
D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding no
protection of speech regarding threats for same).
286
See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1066; D.M., 647 F.3d at 759.
287
See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 383–84, 391 (5th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (determining that there is no First Amendment protection for a violent online rap
song with lyrics complaining about the sexual misconduct of a football coach), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1374 (S.D.
Fla. 2010) (finding “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met” online social
media space was protected speech); D. G. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. 00-C-0614-E,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at *3–4, *13–19 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2000) (protecting a
student poem with the words “Killing Mrs. [Teacher]” because there was no intent
to transmit).
288
See 494 F.3d at 38.
289
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015); see also Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (articulating true threat standard allowing
criminal punishment only where a reasonable recipient of the speech would find that
speech to be a serious expression of an intent to harm).
290
See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
291
Id. (quoting Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)).
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conviction, but was clear that mere negligence or accident is not
enough.292 Further, there is no controlling Supreme Court guidance
on what standard ought to apply to such civil actions as studentinitiated First Amendment lawsuits to fight an expulsion based on
an alleged threat made via social media.293
SPORTS/COACHES. Fifth, if the student speech comes within
the context of a team sport and substantially undermines the coach,
the First Amendment will not protect such speech as advocacy to
fire the coach while remaining on the team.294 But the area of team
sports as physical education may be unique, and should not be
extended beyond this narrow body of law. The Sixth Circuit
analysis in Lowery might lead to the flawed conclusion that a
faculty newspaper advisor or debate club sponsor would also be
allowed to dismiss a student from the club or newspaper for
insubordination.295 It should not, since the rationale behind the
holding in Lowery goes directly to the unique nature of team
sports.296 Also, it is the Author’s opinion that the facts and issue
presented in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board underscore the
point that where the student speech is directed at a coach in his
general capacity as a school employee, rather than as a coach, the
Lowery rule should not apply.297 That is, coaches ought to be able
to discipline players for disloyalty, including undermining the
authority of the coach.298 But if a non-athlete makes a claim
against a coach which has nothing to do with the team, as was the
case in Bell, the First Amendment ought to protect the student
292

See id. at 2012–13.
See Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
294
See generally Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d at 584, 595–601 (6th Cir. 2007).
295
See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 596, 600–01.
296
Id. at 595 (“Mutual respect for the coach is an important ingredient of
team chemistry.”).
297
See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 393, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2015) (en
banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). Note that Bell is closer to Evans than Lowery.
See id. at 391, 393; cf. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1374 (S.D. Fla.
2010) (holding that student’s social media post about her opinion on her teacher was
protected speech). The student speaker in Bell was not a player who wanted the coach
fired, but instead intended (with or without justification) to expose two adult school
employees, who happened to be coaches, for allegedly acting sexually and improperly
toward students. See Bell, 799 F.3d at 398. These facts are distinguishable from the
player-initiated petition to fire the coach in Lowery. See id. at 391, 393.
298
See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 594–96.
293
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speech in the absence of some other policy rationale—such as
protecting school employees from threats.299 It should be
inapplicable when the speech is a matter of public concern not
related to the sport, such as student speech purporting to expose
crime, fraud, or improper sexual acts of school employees.300
FORESEEABILITY/NEXUS TO SCHOOL. Sixth and finally,
foreseeability—or the lack thereof—seems to be the most
fundamental unifying concept among the off-campus speech cases.
The First Amendment will protect speech characterized as a
“wholly accidental” arrival onto school grounds.301 There exists in
the cases a continuum between foreseeability on the one hand, and
inadvertent transmission of speech to campus on the other. That is,
the closer the nexus between the speech and the school, the more
likely the speech is unprotected—provided that it also falls within
one of the school speech exceptions, such as Tinker’s material
disruption test. The Fifth Circuit held the student artist of the
“siege” scene in Porter is protected by the First Amendment
because his brother brought the work to the school by accident.302

299

See Bell, 799 F.3d at 398–407 (showing how majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions divide along the rationale of whether the student speech at issue is primarily a
threat from which school employees should be protected, or whistleblower speech of a
student that is due protection under the First Amendment).
300
See id. This argument was advanced on behalf of the student would-be
whistleblower/rap artist in Bell but was rejected by the court. See id. at 400. The “TinkerCyberbully Test” advanced below at Section V.B. would protect the speech of the known
student/rapper in Bell, because the speech is arguably a bona fide critique of the school’s
propensity to allow sexual harassment of students by school employees. Cf. id. at 433–43
(Prado, J., dissenting). But see id. at 402–03 (Costa, J., concurring). Had Bell’s rap
message been directed anonymously toward another student, it is the Author’s view that
Bell would, and should, lose his anonymity protection under the First Amendment. See
generally Benjamin A. Holden, Unmasking the Teen Cyberbully: A First AmendmentCompliant Approach to Protecting Child Victims of Anonymous, School-Related Internet
Harassment, 51 Akron L. Rev. 1 (2017) (building upon this Article and proposing a legal
standard for judicial orders requiring internet service providers to supply the internet
protocol address of computers sending anonymous school-related cyberbullying
messages to student victims called the “Cyberbully Unmasking Test”); see also McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995) (finding a constitutional right to
anonymous speech implied in the First Amendment).
301
Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 617 (5th Cir. 2004).
302
See id.
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Other cases seem to follow this approach.303 Indeed, one factor
cited in Snyder was the student’s efforts to keep the offending web
page “private.”304 Speech which is accidently or inadvertently
transmitted to a campus seems to place such speech in a category
analogous to a password protected online Facebook page. The
notion of “intent to communicate” seems to be a distinguishing
touchstone, separating those speech fact patterns which judges find
protected by the First Amendment from those which are
unprotected. The concept that most rationally and logically
balances the interests of student victims, with the rights of student
speakers, and the obligations and responsibilities of school
administrators, is the “nexus” analysis the Kowalski court
employed.305 The Kowalski court probed the link between the offcampus internet-based bullying speech of one student directed
specifically at another, where a large number of fellow students
were affirmatively invited to join in the cyberbullying.306 The court
concluded that despite the off-campus character of the speech, the
communication nonetheless had a sufficient “nexus” to the
“[s]chool’s pedagogical interests” in keeping good order and
protecting student victims.307 This approach may be the best place
to start in developing a flexible, widely applicable test to separate
student speech which ought to be protected by the First
Amendment from that which, as a matter of policy, the Supreme
Court should allow schools to discipline. After all, neither the text
of the First Amendment,308 nor any subsequent case rendered by
the Court contemplates the school-punishment-of-cyberbully
paradigm. In the absence of facts that square up with a post-Tinker
cyberbully student speech decision, linking the speech to the
303

See, e.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1376–77 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (noting
that post expressing student’s dislike for her teacher was never seen by the teacher and
removed before students returned to school following an extended weekend).
304
See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012).
305
See 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012).
306
See id. at 567.
307
Id. at 573.
308
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”).
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school through a “nexus” test appears to be the most fair and
logical point of departure articulated by any court decision
researched for this Article.
VI.

TOWARD A NATIONAL STANDARD FOR OFF-CAMPUS
CYBERBULLY SPEECH
Formulation of a fair and workable legal rule which might vie
for consideration as a preferred approach in the adjudication of
Cyberbully speech cases requires context. The majority of the
underlying principles and assumptions of the student speech cases
pre-date teens’ widespread use of the Internet as a primary means
of communication.309 Courts should begin with the premise that
traditional boundaries of the “schoolhouse gate” are meaningless in
2016, and will become even more irrelevant in the future.310
A. The Need for a Constitutionally Valid Off-Campus Standard
The U.S. Supreme Court has been silent on the question of
whether schools have jurisdiction to regulate off-campus speech by
students.311 There are twelve regional federal circuits, each with its
own court of appeals; however, there should not be twelve versions
of the First Amendment. There have been repeated calls for
309

Note that the most recent student speech case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
was Morse v. Frederick in 2007—two years before Facebook supplanted MySpace as
America’s dominant social media network. See 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
310
This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court’s “basic principles” guiding analysis
for application of the First Amendment to new media should be imperiled or even
amended. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). The TinkerCyberbully Test extends, rather than creates, a new basic principle. “And whatever the
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic
principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do
not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication appears.” Id. (quoting
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)). It is the Author’s opinion that
virtual teaching and virtual classrooms, already common at the college level, will make
their way more frequently to the doorstep of home schooled and other public school
children who are nonetheless under the jurisdiction of local school districts.
311
See, e.g., Kowalski, 652 F.3d 565; J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.,
650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012) (consolidated with
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011));
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011); see
also HAYES, supra note 3, at 49.

286

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:233

Supreme Court guidance,312 but to no avail.313 In this void, half of
the federal circuits—the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Ninth—have implicitly or explicitly concluded that off-campus
speech can be regulated and/or banned by schools;314 although the
only consistent conclusion among the courts seems to be that
student speech, which implies eventual violence by the speaker, is
not protectable.315 Research revealed no controlling appellate

312

See generally Waldman, supra note 7, at 617–18; S. Kate Fletcher, Note,
Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Social Media Rams the Tinker Schoolhouse
Gate: A New Approach for Online Student Speech, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1113
(2013); Katherine Hokenson, Comment, My Teacher Sux! [Censored]: Protecting
Students’ Right to Free Speech on the Internet, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
385, 407–08 (2011) (analyzing controversies over students’ online criticism of
school officials).
313
See Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 208 (2007) (“[C]ases involving speech in the schools are
overwhelmingly more common in the state and federal inferior courts than are cases
dealing with . . . any of a host of other First Amendment subjects . . . .”); see also HAYES,
supra note 3, at 49; David L. Hudson Jr., Time for the Supreme Court to Address OffCampus, Online Student Speech, 91 OR. L. REV. 621, 621 (2012); Aaron J. Hersh, Note,
Rehabilitating Tinker: A Modest Proposal to Protect Public-School Students’ First
Amendment Free Expression Rights in the Digital Age, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1309 (2013). See
generally Martha McCarthy, Cyberbullying Laws and First Amendment Rulings: Can
They Be Reconciled?, 83 MISS. L.J. 805, 805–06 (2014) (criticizing the Supreme Court
for its failure to act on the growing cyberbully discord in the wake of Tinker).
314
However, the Ninth Circuit in Wynar v. Douglas County School District sought
guidance from the Third Circuit en banc opinion in Snyder, and concluded that “[t]he
Third and Fifth Circuits have left open the question whether Tinker applies to off-campus
speech.” 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013). This Article respectfully disagrees with
this narrow reading of the cases in those two circuits, in light of the analyses of the Third
Circuit’s Snyder opinion and the Fifth Circuit’s Porter opinion. The federal district court
in T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Community School Corp. took the same view as the
Author on the Third Circuit’s assumption of Tinker’s applicability to cyberspeech. See
807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 781 (N.D. Ind. 2011). The Snyder dissent, signed by six Third
Circuit appellate judges, also notes the Snyder majority’s “apparent adoption of the rule
that off-campus student speech can rise to the level of a substantial disruption.” Snyder,
650 F.3d at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
315
See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1074–75 (finding school discipline based on multiple
threatening messages yielded no First Amendment violation); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v.
Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2011); see also B.V., 807 F.
Supp. 2d at 771–72, 790 (determining that sexually raunchy humor and photos are
protected by First Amendment and that the school district violated students’ First
Amendment rights by suspending them). Compare Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920 (ruling that
the school violated a student’s First Amendment rights by suspending her for making a
cruel parody of the school’s principal on a fake MySpace page), with Kowalski, 652 F.3d
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authority from any circuit for the proposition that Tinker puts offcampus speech beyond the school’s reach as a matter of law.316
Some courts weighing the issue do not directly address the
jurisdiction question, but instead presume it.317 However, these
inconsistent and conflicting results for the individual students
involved stem from similar fact patterns in different courts. These
courts appear to leap directly from Tinker, decided the year
America first landed a man on the Moon, to this Brave New World
in which student speech is instantaneously uttered, beamed into
outer space, and returned to the eyes and ears of hundreds or even
thousands of fellow students in the blink of an eye.
What is needed is a predictable, underlying legal test, based on
the collective learning of the off-campus cyberspeech cases, but
divorced from the peculiar facts of each case. Many of these cases
have harsh, even disgusting language, sometimes interspersed with
legitimate literary parody, social criticism, or critiques of the
public school or its employees. If the government, as manifest in
school authority, misbehaves, students deserve the right to speak
and expose wrongdoing. Failing to acknowledge this concern
would invite the evil of sedition, or punishment by government for
criticism of government, into the schoolhouse gate. But the way the
cases now arise from speech, to discipline, to courthouse, to
resolution is arbitrary and inconsistent. Some cases appear to be
exercises in gut instincts followed by random judicial
conclusions.318 The offensive language is tweeted, posted to
at 567, 574–77 (ruling that the suspension a high schooler for creating MySpace page
mocking a classmate for allegedly having herpes did not violate the constitution).
316
However, as discussed above, the five-judge concurring opinion in Snyder takes the
view that Tinker forbids school jurisdiction over off-campus speech as a matter of law,
while joining with the eight judges who signed the majority opinion, which presumed that
Tinker allowed school jurisdiction. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 936 (Smith, J., concurring).
317
See B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (exampling such a district court decision within the
Seventh Circuit); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370–71, 1376–77 (S.D. Fla.
2010) (exampling such a district court decision within the Eleventh Circuit); D. G. v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. 00-C-0614-E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at *10–15
(N.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2000) (exampling such a district court decision within the
Tenth Circuit).
318
See, e.g., Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 576–77 (ruling that cruel fake web pages are not
protected by First Amendment); Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920 (ruling that cruel fake web
pages are protected by First Amendment); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 340–41,
351 (2d Cir. 2011) (ruling that mean blog posts are not protected by First Amendment),
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Facebook, texted, or blogged to classmates, the language becomes
a “thing” with other students, the principal finds out, the student is
suspended, the parents sue, and the courts cite to Tinker and flip a
coin. Violence or true threats always seem to trump First
Amendment concerns, and this is as it should be. But what about
everything else?
B. The Tinker-Cyberbully Test319
Employing Tinker with no eye toward the realities of modern
internet speech and communications has led to inconsistent results
among the federal circuits and the attendant lack of clear guidance
for lower courts. Instead, courts should interpret the seminal school
speech case in light of the best approaches by courts that have
wrestled with the issues, until the Supreme Court settles the matter.
What follows is the Tinker-Cyberbully Test, a proposed multi-part
standard for courts to apply to off-campus speech, which in the
social media era, is frequently cyberspeech:320

cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011); B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 772, 790 (ruling that parody
sex photos are protected by First Amendment).
319
As discussed previously, all disruptive off-campus speech in the internet era is not
cyberspeech. However, the fact patterns in the case law are strongly trending toward
internet-based communications. Thus, the solution contemplated in this Article presumes
off-campus speech problems are based in cyberspeech. It is obvious that on-campus
cyberspeech—say, a mean text from a student in the cafeteria to a student in a
classroom—is already clearly covered under Tinker and is not in need of a new,
consistent legal solution.
320
Such speech is assumed to be a product of the “social media” era. This Article
places the start of the “social media era” around the year 2000, although an exact date is
not a premise of this analysis. For background and context only, it is noteworthy that
early social media sites were niche sites targeted to racial minorities: AsianAvenue.com,
founded in 1997, BlackPlanet.com in 1999, and Hispanic-oriented MiGente.com in 2000.
See Digital Trends Staff, The History of Social Networking, DIGITAL TRENDS (May 16,
2016),
http://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking/
[https://perma.cc/6N3T-MB2N]. These niche sites were followed soon after by the nowubiquitous general audience social media networks such as Friendster in 2002, LinkedIn
and MySpace in 2003, and Facebook, which was launched in 2004, but finally opened to
the general public in 2006. See id.; see also Jeff Burt, Facebook at [Ten]: Highlights in
the
Social
Networking
Pioneer’s
History,
EWEEK
(Feb. 6,
2014),
http://www.eweek.com/cloud/slideshows/facebook-at-10-highlights-in-the-socialnetworking-pioneers-history.html [https://perma.cc/2M36-M8LM] (discussing the
evolution of Facebook).
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(a) Was it reasonably foreseeable from the perspective of an
objective adult that the student speech would reach321 the
campus environment? If no, stop. The speech is protected by
the First Amendment;322
(b) Was the message contained in the student speech arguably a
bona fide critique of the job performance or decisions of school
employees,323 the school itself, or an obvious parody?324 If yes
to any of these, stop. The speech is protected by the First
Amendment;325 and
321

The Fifth Circuit in Porter, and perhaps the Sixth in Lowery, analyzed speech
created off-campus and physically transported back to campus. See discussion supra
Sections IV.E–F. For purposes of this Article, the jurisdictional question of regulating
off-campus speech which was physically transported to a campus is deemed legally
indistinguishable from the question of jurisdiction over internet-originated cyberbullying.
322
The school lacks “jurisdiction” because the speech is not school-related and beyond
the reach of Tinker. See generally Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir.
1979); see also Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 618–19 (5th Cir. 2004).
323
Commentators and courts both tend to distinguish between disparaging student
speech which targets students, versus that which targets school employees, particularly if
employee fitness is part of the disparagement. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920, 931 n.9; cf.
Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567. The rationales differ, but a consistent theme in the literature
as well as the cases is that disruption is more likely when the victim is a child, who likely
has less personal maturity and ability to withstand cruel jokes and teasing. See, e.g., Watt
Lesley Black, Jr., Omnipresent Student Speech and the Schoolhouse Gate: Interpreting
Tinker in the Digital Age, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 531, 554 (2015).
324
See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47–48, 57 (1988) (finding First
Amendment protection for the parody of a public figure preacher claiming he had sex
with his mother in an outhouse). However, when dealing with schoolchildren and meanspirited speech, particularly over the Internet, the vexing “parody problem” becomes
more complicated. That is, where is the line between the Layshock and Snyder fake web
pages claiming principals used steroids or “hit on” students, which the Third Circuit said
nobody took seriously, versus the one in Kowalski which claimed a young woman had
herpes? Compare Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920–21, with Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207–09 (3d Cir. 2011); see also W. Wat Hopkins,
Snyder v. Phelps, Private Persons and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A
Chance for the Supreme Court to Set Things Right, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 149, 178–79
(2010) (“The [Court’s Hustler] opinion tells us almost nothing about whether the
Constitution protects outrageous communications that are privately disseminated rather
than displayed in the pages of a nationally distributed magazine . . . or whether it protects
outrageous communications that are designed to hurt or embarrass private figures . . . .”
(quoting Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV.
601, 615 (1990))).
325
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a main purpose of a public school
system is reinforcing the values of free thought, Democracy, and self-governance. See,
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(c) Was the speech reasonably likely to (i) substantially disrupt
the student learning environment326 or (ii) materially interfere
with the ability of any other student to learn?327 If no to both,
the speech is protected by the First Amendment. If yes to

e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom. ‘The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than
in the community of American schools.’ The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather]
than through any kind of authoritative selection.’” (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (first quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); then quoting United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943))). The Third Circuit favorably
cited Keyishian in a well-reasoned dissent by Judge D. Michael Fisher in a 2011
cyberbullying case, quoting this exact language and adding: “Schools should foster an
environment of learning that is vital to the functioning of a democratic system and the
maturation of a civic body.” Snyder, 650 F.3d at 944 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
326
The issue of true threats is implied in the “disturbance” prong of the TinkerCyberbully Test. A factual finding by a school that a student’s expression can be
“reasonably understood as urging violent conduct” is adequate to support a school
suspension, expulsion, or other discipline. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38
(2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). The Author urges courts to follow the reasoning of the
Third Circuit in Wisniewski rather than that of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which
would protect student speech employing such words as “kill” in messages if the school
could not prove that: (1) the student subjectively either intended to make a threat or,
perhaps, (2) that the student was reckless in communicating his message. See discussion
supra Sections IV.H–I. This is bad policy; it strips away from school administrators any
latitude in disciplining speech that is completely inappropriate in a school environment,
but does not meet the constitutional criminal law requirements of Watts and Elonis. See
United States v. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). That criminal due process standard now constitutionally
required for adult criminal defendants goes too far to be applied to the review of school
administrative discipline, and ought to yield to the overriding public interest in protecting
the school environment. It should be noted, however, that adoption of the contrary
approach—essentially giving students an affirmative defense if the school cannot prove
adequate subjective intent—would leave the remaining parts of the “Cyberbully
Unmasking Test” undisturbed and still of potential use to courts. See supra notes 299–
300 and accompanying text.
327
Further refinement of this test to directly address the issue of true threats versus
childish jokes might include an affirmative defense for student speakers who have been
“cleared” by police. Such an affirmative defense might reverse the decision in
Wisniewski. See 494 F.3d at 36 (noting police investigator concluded that allegedly
threatening speech was a “joke” and closed the criminal case against the student).
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either, the speech is unprotected by the First Amendment and
the school may discipline the student.
VII.

APPLYING THE TINKER-CYBERBULLY TEST TO SIX
REPRESENTATIVE CASES
A newly proposed legal standard to a developing problem is of
no use if it has no practical application. It is of even less use if it
thwarts expectations and leads to unexpected and inconsistent
results. The section below applies the Tinker-Cyberbully Test to
six328 cases,329 all of which were previously discussed in this
Article. These cases were chosen for two reasons. First, they raise
the broad array of issues confronted by modern schools, and
eventually appellate courts. Second, their original (actual) judicial
results highlight the random results delivered by federal courts,
underscoring the conflict among the circuits and the need for a
national standard for school discipline of off-campus
cyberbully speech.
The Supreme Court, in any cyberbullying case granted
certiorari to decide the off-campus speech issue, would do well to
assist lower courts by sharpening the meaning of “disruption.”330
That is, disruption of whom within the learning environment? This
analysis takes the view that the initial rationale to protect students
is best advanced by limiting Tinker’s disruption exception to
disruption of student learning.331 If the teachers are made
uncomfortable in the faculty lounge by a blog suggesting that they
do a poor job of teaching, they should have no ability to go on a
witch hunt to find their detractors. Thus, part “(c)” of the TinkerCyberbully Test is written to intentionally insert the adjective
“student” prior to “learning environment,” slightly modifying the
Tinker standard as applied to the punishment or protection of off328

Two “violence” cases are combined and treated as a single case because their facts
are legally indistinguishable for purposes of this analysis.
329
See infra Sections VII.A–F. Other than the first three cases, which need no
alteration, the facts may be altered slightly to allow application of the
Tinker-Cyberbully Test.
330
See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–15
(1969) (formulating the disruption test).
331
See, e.g., id. at 512–14.
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campus speech. This gives greater protection to student speakers,
who would not be subject to expulsion or suspension from thinskinned adults. But of course, student speech aimed at an adult
could do so much damage that it actually does affect the students’
learning environment. On such facts, the speaker would not
be protected.
A. Case 1: Doninger v. Niehoff332: Insulting Critique of
School Authority
Under the Tinker-Cyberbully Test, Doninger was incorrectly
decided.333 In Doninger, a student, Avery Doninger, wrote several
entries in her publicly accessible blog detailing her ongoing
negotiations with school administrators about the scheduling of a
high school-sponsored concert called “Jamfest.”334 She called
school officials “douchebags” and ignored repeated requests to
stop criticizing school officials, ultimately leading a protest that
consisted of having students wear shirts in support of Avery and/or
free speech rights.335 The Second Circuit concluded that the school
was justified in disciplining Doninger and that her speech was
unprotected by the First Amendment.336
Under the Tinker-Cyberbully Test, courts should reach the
opposite result. First, though insulting, no reasonable person could
have believed that school administrators were actual
“douchebags.”337 And second, the insults hurled at her school
authority figures were all cloaked in her unfavorable critique of
their job performance.338 Other scholarly commentaries have
suggested that the Doninger case was incorrectly decided and/or
332

642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011).
See id. at 358 (upholding school discipline of student for harsh critique of school
officials’ policy decision communicated via social media).
334
See id. at 339–41.
335
See id. at 340–44.
336
See id. at 351, 358.
337
See id. at 349 (discussing the possible disruptiveness of, inter alia, the term
“douchebags” and the blog posts).
338
See id. at 340–41. The clearest example of this critique defense reviewed for this
Article is the district court case from the Southern District of Florida in which a student
created a blog claiming her teacher was the “worst teacher I’ve ever met.” See Evans v.
Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (determining that the statement
was protected under the First Amendment, just as the Tinker-Cyberbully Test would).
333
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criticized its reasoning.339 Applying the Tinker-Cyberbully Test,
the student wins, reversing the result340 in the actual case.341
B. Case 2: Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District342: Cruel
Parody of School Authority
The Third Circuit found that J.S., the eighth-grade honor
student who created a phony MySpace page to ridicule her
principal in jest, engaged in First Amendment protected activity.343
Although the phony web page—when viewed as a bona fide
critique of government, or school administration—contained scant
legitimate criticism of the principal, it did “complain” that the
principal’s hobby is “detention.”344 Her parody of her principal
was vulgar, juvenile, and nonsensical according to the majority
opinion from the Third Circuit345 and “mean-spirited” as well as
“insulting” according to the concurrence.346 But because it was
directed at an adult, the Tinker-Cyberbully Test—certainly not the
exclusive remedy of an adult wronged by a child—would offer no
remedy to her principal. The conclusion, both in the actual Third
Circuit en banc case and under this new hypothetical standard, is
339

See, e.g., Allison E. Hayes, Note, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v.
Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43
AKRON L. REV. 247, 271–84 (2010); see also Travis Miller, Note, Doninger v. Niehoff:
Taking Tinker Too Far, 5 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 303, 321–29 (2011).
340
See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 358.
341
It should be well noted that courts tend to be much more forgiving of student-toadult cyberbullying than taunts directed to students. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920–21 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing student cyberinsults directed at an adult), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); cf. Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing student cyber-insults
directed at another student), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012). The initial portion of
Part “(c)” of the Tinker-Cyberbully Test should be read literally: Was the speech
reasonably likely to substantially disrupt the student learning environment? Thus, a harsh
or even profane critique of teachers, principals, and administrators, so frequently the
subject of such disputes, would be presumptively disfavored as justification for discipline
unless some student was impacted. The principal and teachers can avail themselves of the
courts and seek other remedies if they are libeled or criminally harassed. Adults have
greater access to the courts and the initial policy rationale of the exception left for Tinker
was to protect students, not school employees.
342
650 F.3d 915.
343
See id. at 933.
344
See id. at 920–21.
345
See id. at 929.
346
Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring).
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that the school lacks authority to punish this student speech, which
is protected by the First Amendment.347
The student speaker in Snyder should win for three reasons,
although none of them clear-cut. First, she has the parody defense,
upon which the Third Circuit relied to dispose of the actual case.348
Next, she has the disruption defense—that is, student learning was
not actually impacted.349 It appears that the parody only distracted
administrators and even they, according to the court record, did not
invest much time in the matter.350 And third, she has the
foreseeability defense, since she took steps to keep the offending
web page private.351 Applying the Tinker-Cyberbully Test, the
student wins—the same result352 as in the actual case.353
C. Case 3: Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools354: Gratuitous
Student Cyberbullying
Kowalski was judged by the Fourth Circuit to be subject to
discipline because it was reasonably foreseeable that the student’s
online speech would have such a close nexus to the school
environment that it should be deemed virtual student speech.355
Kara Kowalski, who tormented Shay N. with the false charge that
347
Note that the analysis under Layshock would be identical to that of Snyder due to the
similarity of the facts. Compare id. at 920–23 (discussing student’s creation of a fake
social media profile of student’s principal), with Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207–10 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing same).
348
See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 929 (“Moreover, the profile, though indisputably vulgar,
was so juvenile and nonsensical that no reasonable person could take its content
seriously, and the record clearly demonstrates that no one did.”).
349
See id. at 928 (“There is no dispute that J.S.’s speech did not cause a substantial
disruption in the school.”).
350
See id. at 922–23.
351
See id. at 928–29 (“The facts in this case do not support the conclusion that a
forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable.”); see also id. at 930.
352
See id. at 933.
353
Note that without steps to keep the web page private and with slightly more
disruption as a matter of fact, the result could be reversed under the
Tinker-Cyberbully Test.
354
652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012). The Kowalski
court expressly addressed the “child protection” notion and derived the “Nexus to
School’s Pedagogical Interests” test, which appears to be a web-era play upon
Hazelwood’s “legitimate pedagogical interest” standard. See id. at 573; see also
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
355
See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573; see also supra notes 305–08 and accompanying text.
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the girl had herpes,356 would also get no First Amendment
protection under the Tinker-Cyberbully Test. The school prevailed
in the actual case,357 consistent with the result here. The school can
easily make its concrete showing, demonstrating foreseeability in
Kara Kowalski’s decision to invite classmates to comment on the
site.358 Further, there was nothing redeeming or related to a critique
of the school or administration in the subject speech.359 The speech
caused great harm to its victim, Shay N., which was clearly Ms.
Kowalski’s intent.360 This case, like Wilson,361 is an example of
gratuitous student-to-student cyberbullying which is unworthy of
the First Amendment’s protection as a matter of policy. Applying
the Tinker-Cyberbully Test, the school wins—the same result362 as
in the actual case.
D. Case 4: Lowery v. Euverard: Written Anti-Coach Mutiny by
Players Is Unprotected
A fair and sensible cyberspeech test must allow coaches to
avoid on-the-field mutiny, but protect political and socially
important student speech. A coach’s job in part is to teach, and one
of the things a high school coach teaches is teamwork. Part “(b)”
of the Tinker-Cyberbully Test—while requiring some unavoidable
judicial discretion—takes care to modify the noun “criticism” with
the adjective “bona fide.”363 A court moving toward the conclusion
that there has been no bona fide critique in a specific case of
student speech criticizing an employee-coach could take shelter
under Hazelwood’s “imprimatur of the school”364 umbrella. Thus,
a finding that the criticism was illegitimate would support a finding
that the school needs to teach teamwork and cohesion in team
356

See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567–68.
See id. at 577.
358
See id. at 567, 574.
359
See generally id. at 567–69.
360
See id. at 576 (“Kowalski’s role . . . was particularly mean-spirited and hateful. The
webpage called on classmates, in a pack, to target Shay N., knowing that it would
be hurtful . . . .”).
361
696 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing twin brothers who created sexually
explicit and racist blog that targeted other school children to review the content).
362
See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 577.
363
See supra Section VI.B.
364
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
357
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sports, a legitimate pedagogical concern for student-athletes to be
sure. If the coach is endangering the health or safety of players—
but doing so only at private practices—a petition to fire that coach
ought to be protected speech. This is a matter of evidentiary
proof.365 If, as was the case in Lowery,366 the players simply do not
“like” the coach due to personnel or tactical differences of opinion,
such speech is materially disruptive to the learning environment on
the sports field. Coaches have been kicking players off high school
football teams for as long as there have been high school football
teams. The Tinker-Cyberbully Test would not and should not
disturb legitimate dismissals of insubordinate players. Thus, the
school wins; the same result367 occurs as in actual case.
E. Case 5: D.M./Wynar: Two Cases of Violent Student Speech368
These two cases are treated as one because they are legally
indistinguishable. School administrators in both could find it
reasonably foreseeable that specific threats of violence by a student
could cause substantial disruption.369 The speech in both cases
would easily be removed from the realm of First Amendment
protection—whether employing the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s
requirement that the school comply with the criminal law “true
threat” intent-of-the-speaker370 requirements of Watts—or the
more school-deferential approach advocated by the Second Circuit
in Wisniewski.371 Either way, on extreme facts calling for specific
acts of violence against specific fellow students, the TinkerCyberbully Test would allow administrative/school punishment of
off-campus cyberbullying. The School wins; achieving the same
result as in the actual cases.372

365

See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2007).
See generally id. at 585–86.
367
See id. at 600–01.
368
Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013); D.J.M. ex rel.
D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011).
369
See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1065–66; D.M., 647 F.3d at 765.
370
See Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621–27 (8th Cir. 2002) (en
banc); Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371–73
(9th Cir. 1996).
371
See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007).
372
Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1075; D.M., 647 F.3d at 767.
366
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F. Case 6: The Wisniewski Problem: Comic-Violent Speech
Student speech comprised of both comedy and potential threats
poses a particularly troublesome problem for courts. Given the
toxic mix of immature bravado, anti-establishment machismo, and
plain juvenile silliness found in the cases, it is often difficult to
separate potentially dangerous student cyberspeech from that
which is merely tasteless.373 Beyond the larger question of Tinker’s
reach to off-campus speech—the central question presented in this
Article—is the related issue of whether administrative school
discipline based on a student threat requires subjective intent to
harm beyond mere negligence.374 The Tinker-Cyberbully Test
adopts what this Article will call the Wisniewski Rule, most clearly
articulated by the Second Circuit.375 The Wisniewski Rule rejects
the criminal due process protections of Watts.376 This result allows
schools greater discretion despite law enforcement’s independent
determination that, for example, a student was only joking when
making alleged threats, therefore giving school officials greater
flexibility to impose administrative discipline, such as suspensions,
in the interests of the practical realities of maintaining school
order.377 Applying the Tinker-Cyberbully Test to the Wisniewski
facts results in the school discipline being upheld, which is the
same result378 as in the actual case.

373

See, e.g., Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36–37 (noting that police investigator concluded
allegedly threatening speech was a “joke” although school took the threat seriously and
suspended student).
374
See supra Section IV.B.
375
See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38 (“[W]e think that school officials have significantly
broader authority to sanction student speech than the Watts standard allows.”). Note that
the Supreme Court offered greater specificity to the requirements of Watts in Elonis. See
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012–14 (2015) (holding that threatening
statements are analyzed not from the perspective of the alleged victim, but by the intent
of the maker of the alleged threat, and that to support a criminal conviction, the mindset
of the speaker must be proven to evince a “true threat” requiring a level of mens rea or
intent greater than negligence).
376
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (articulating true
threat standard allowing criminal punishment only where a reasonable recipient of the
speech would find that speech to be a serious expression of an intent to harm).
377
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38.
378
See id. at 39–40.
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G. Test Would Change One of Six Results, But Offer Predictability
In summary, the Tinker-Cyberbully Test would likely allow a
public school to punish the cyberbully in two-of-the-six cases
analyzed immediately above.379 Off-campus student speech would
generally be protected if it harshly critiques adult employees or
parodies authority. Student speech is unprotected if it is disruptive
and aimed at another student, or if it is a “true threat” under the
applicable local administrative standard, which may be lower than
the constitutional criminal law standard.380 The Tinker-Cyberbully
Test would change the result in just one of the six cases above,381
but offer greater predictability of result. The fundamental shift
between the actual cases and their likely adjudication under this
hypothetical new rule is that student speakers would virtually
always win when their speech focused on a critique of the school
or its employees, or when its arrival on campus was unforeseeable
by a reasonable adult. The student would nearly always lose when
the speech was an affirmative cruel bullying of a fellow student,
particularly where classmates are invited to “publically” join in.
CONCLUSION
The question presented in this Article was whether primary and
secondary schools can exert disciplinary authority consistent with
the First Amendment over student cyberspeech that originates offcampus, makes its way “onto” campus, and at the time it was
communicated, raised a reasonably foreseeable risk of material
school disruption. A growing circuit conflict, and the lack of
Supreme Court guidance in an age of widespread student use of
social media, makes the question more urgent than ever. The
Article first reviewed and analyzed the conflicting federal circuit
court cases in the area, concluding that schools can, consistent with
the First Amendment, discipline student off-campus speech—
including cyberbullying, if based on appropriate facts. Then a new
379

See supra Sections VII.A–F.
See supra Section VII.F (noting and discussing the Wisniewski Rule).
381
See supra Section VII.A (applying the Tinker-Cyberbully Test to Doninger facts,
and reaching a different result than in the actual case of Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d
334, 358 (2d Cir. 2011)).
380
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legal standard for such discipline (or protection) of off-campus
speech was proposed. The Tinker-Cyberbully Test urges the courts
toward a moderate and realistic legal standard in light of the
modern-day realities of cyberspace, where the twenty-first century
student speaker now lives and communicates. Under the TinkerCyberbully Test, courts are offered a new, consistent standard for
determining when Tinker’s disruptive student speech paradigm
should be extended to off-campus speakers, including cyberbullies.
The test allows latitude for student speakers to critique their
schools and the job performance of teachers, principals, and other
school personnel. But where the student has allegedly made a “true
threat,” or has engaged in disruptive student-to-student
cyberbullying, school administrators may discipline the student.
The test does not magically solve the entire problem. But it would
offer consistency and predictability among the federal circuit
courts now in conflict, as well as offer clarity to students, parents,
teachers, principals, and school districts.

